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3P r e f a c e
This JRC Scientific and Policy Report is an account and 
synthesis of the ENP-Ukraine project «Prospects of the 
Farming Sector and Rural development in European 
Neighborhood Policy Countries. The case of Ukraine» under 
contract number 152201-2011 A08-NL issued by JRC-IPTS, 
Seville and awarded under a restricted call to the Centre for 
World Food Studies in Amsterdam (Dutch acronym: SOW-
VU). The Centre for World Food Studies subcontracted the 
Institute for Economics and Forecasting (IEF) of the National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine as executor of the main 
deliverables. 
The deliverables consist of the main report on the current 
situation of the agricultural sector in Ukraine and the 
transition it went through (Agricultural Report), the three 
policy briefs, presenting a quantitative analysis of topical 
issues of the transition, and the training courses on the 
statistical techniques used in this project. More specifically:
a. Main report (Agricultural Report) : 
The Institutional and Policy Framework of Agricultural 
and Rural Economy in Ukraine
b. Policy briefs:
1. The improvement of rural incomes – commercialisation 
of farming households
2. Land lease and rent rates: towards benefits of 
smallholders
3. Grain potential of Ukraine to contribute to world food 
security: opportunities and challenges
   
c. Two training courses on statistical techniques for IEF 
and IPTS, respectively. 
These four unpublished papers (the main report and the 
three policy briefs) provide the input for the present final 
report by SOW-VU and IEF, which also provides a synthesis 
of findings.
The project started in April 2011 and lasted for 18 months. 
The final results have been presented by the IEF-team in a 
workshop in Kiev on 31 May 2012. 
Preface
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9E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y
Rural economy
1. Following the decollectivisation of agriculture in Ukraine, 
the dualisation between very large commercial farms and 
small individual farms has become a prevalent trend in the 
rural areas of Ukraine.
2. Rural farm households would need larger plots. They 
could benefit from mechanization.
3. Yet, as their crop yields are low and lie close to those 
of large farms that use far more chemical inputs and 
machinery, the area expansion could be kept modest.
4. Distribution of land ownership rights and cadastral 
registration need to be supplemented by introduction and 
registration of other formal titles such as the right of 
passage and the user rights in commons. 
5. Shareholders of a large farm do not need to know the 
precise location of their property within the farm. Explicit 
cadastral registration of parcels into units smaller than the 
individual field is wasteful.
6. Land users should be made to pay due rent to landowners, 
private (e.g. pensioners), and public (e.g. municipalities), and 
no longer predominantly in kind. This could improve social 
safety nets, stimulate activities in rural villages, and improve 
the fiscal revenue of local governments.
7. Corporate farms should pay corporate taxes.
8. Since growth in employment has been stagnating in urban 
areas, rural areas have to provide for it, partly in horticulture, 
animal husbandry and agricultural processing, and partly 
in expanded household farms, possibly as small multi-
household enterprises or cooperatives, on land returned 
from commercial farms.
Foreign trade
9. Access to exports should be made available to all who 
deliver goods of adequate quality, and not only to specific 
trading companies who can get access to export licenses.
10. Product labeling on exports, could with adequate 
inspections, with labels requiring satisfaction of social as 
well as environmental standards, provide effective means to 
complement and support local governance.
11. Ukraine has considerable scope to step up its exports of 
grain and oilseeds, which might significantly contribute to 
world food security. Yet, to effectuate this expansion without 
amplifying prevailing price volatility, Ukraine will have to 
enhance its management of irrigation, storage and plant 
protection, to limit its support to biofuels and to abstain 
from imposition of export bans in response to shortfalls.
Nutrient management
12. Large exports amount to large outflow of plant nutrients, 
and turn recycling and imports of nutrients into a necessity in 
preventing soil fertility loss and land degradation. Expansion 
of livestock activities with proper manure management also 
helps to compensate for this loss.
Statistics and governance
13. There is domestic and foreign demand for independent and 
reliable information on prevailing social and environmental 
conditions, and trade regimes in Ukraine. A data platform 
that makes use of the available surveys, and avails of some 
capacity to conduct new ones could help meeting this need.
Executive summary
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1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
By concluding bilateral treaties and agreements in various 
domains, the EU has been seeking enhanced cooperation 
with its neighbors. Fields of cooperation include visa policy 
and trade access but also capacity building, in most cases to 
enhance governance and assist the democratization process. 
The cooperation aims to maintain friendly relations, to help 
securing the EU’s borders, and to promote development in 
the EU’s border regions. It may also serve as stepping stone 
to closer association, and even to membership.
One particular aspect of capacity building is to provide 
assistance in setting up analytical capacity in these 
neighboring countries that may provide credible and timely 
economic analysis. This is important for effective democratic 
debate and governance based on trust in the countries 
concerned but also to inform potential foreign investors and 
to conduct a fruitful dialog with the EU itself.
Rural areas are of particular importance in this respect, 
because of their export potential to the EU but also because 
they largely fall beyond the range of observation of the 
international press, harbor a significant fraction of the poor, 
and are the often silent witnesses of environmental pressure.
Ukraine is more than an interesting case in this regard. 
Of the EU’s neighboring countries it is by far the one with 
the largest agricultural potential that has in recent years 
achieved a significant rise in cereals exports, also to the 
EU. Yet, the country has also been struggling with the 
aftermath of decollectivization and has so far not been able 
to avoid poverty, lack of social amenities, and environmental 
degradation in its rural areas.
Concerning the available statistical information in rural 
areas, Ukraine maintained and even extended the practice 
from the Soviet period of conducting relatively large surveys, 
particularly in rural areas, among households and farm 
enterprises. Yet, the data collected are commonly used only 
for computing selected aggregates at regional and national 
level, with very limited cross tabulation across characteristics 
and even less analysis at household and enterprise level. 
Furthermore, for most of the data collecting and processing 
agencies, simultaneous use of such data is still largely 
uncharted territory, and few of these agencies are currently 
equipped with the statistical tools and expertise to exploit 
their data in this way when addressing upcoming questions 
by decision makers. 
The above has led to the formulation of the current study 
which aims to serve as a pilot for providing an assessment 
of the key bottlenecks in agricultural development in 
Ukraine, tapping on available data by means of state-of-
the-art statistical tools, with a focus on trade, social and 
environmental aspects of agricultural transition. Extensive 
use of primary survey data is one of the distinctive features 
of this study. In the current framework the access to the 
major surveys at primary level was available; those data 
were processed (see Annex 1 and 2 for details) and trainings 
on data processing were provided by the institutions involved 
in this study. 
Based on the above aim the current paper is structured  as 
follows. Section 2 provides background on the Ukrainian 
economy, Section 3 describes the emergence of the 
dual agriculture; Sections 4 to 8 the trade, social and 
environmental aspects and Section 9 the concluding remarks 
and policy challenges. 
1. Introduction
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S o m e  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  U k r a i n e ’ s  e c o n o m y
Ukraine is the European country with the largest surface 
(besides Russia), 603 700 sq km of which 324 780 is arable 
land. With 45 million inhabitants, its population numbers 
are low given its size, by comparison to, say, France (549 
000 sq km, of which 183 450 arable, 63.5 million people), 
Germany (357 000 sq km, of which 119 450 arable, 82.0 
million people) or Poland (312 700 sq km, of which 125 390 
arable, 38.3 million people), and hence has more arable land 
than any two of these countries together, see Figure 1.
Ukraine’s relatively open and unprotected borders (Figure 2), 
with only the Dnieper river and its embankments as major, 
internal demarcation line, made it throughout the ages the 
theater of frequent conflicts between East and West, North 
and South, as its fertile lands were always highly prized by 
neighboring powers.
2.  Some background on Ukraine’s 
economy
Soils in Ukraine
The soils in Ukraine, from Northwest to Southeast can be 
divided into three major types: a zone of soils of sandy 
nature (podzolic), a central belt consisting of the fertile black 
earth (chernozem), and a zone of relatively salinized soils 
(chestnut) near the Black Sea. These soils belong to different 
climatic zones of Ukraine (Figure 3). From an agricultural 
point of view the most important ones are: Polissya, Forest-
Steppes and Steppes zones. 
The Polissya (marshy woodlands) zone in the North and 
Northwest covers about 11 mln ha of lowlands. The soils are 
characterized by low humus content, high acidity, low natural 
fertility and a relatively short growing season. Water holding 
capacity is low due to sandiness, resulting in inefficient use 
of both rainfall and plant nutrients. This area is characterized 
Figure 1. Land surface, arable land, and population in Ukraine, compared to large-sized countries in Europe
Note: Surface in 1 000 sq km, population (in 2012) in mln people.
Source: FAOSTAT
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by cereal and industrial crop (mainly oilseed) cultivation, and 
animal husbandry as main farming activities. Considerable 
application of fertilizer and lime is needed to reach adequate 
yields on these soils.
The Forest-steppes zone is located in the central part of 
Ukraine and covers about 20 mln ha of mostly flat land with 
insignificant area of woodlands. Here the famous black soils 
can be found, which are fine grained and easy to cultivate. 
The northern belt consists of typical deep chernozem soils. It 
is the most fertile part, rich in humus and more than a meter 
thick. Yet, because of the continental climate with warmer 
summers, colder winters and lower precipitation in this 
region, there is a risk of frost and snow mold (“winterkill”) 
causing crop failure.
The Steppes zone extends further towards the South and 
the East, where the humus layers are not as thick. This 
area covers about 24 mln ha and is ideally suited for crop 
cultivation, mostly of winter wheat, other grains, sugar beet 
and sunflower, and also hosts some animal husbandry. The 
southern regions are warmest overall, and well suited for 
growing fruits, vegetables and wines, but have a risk of 
drought.
Along the coastlines of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, 
a rather narrow strip of chestnut soils is found, which tend 
to be increasingly salinized to the south as they approach 
the Black Sea. Chestnut soils are not as fertile as the black 
soil, but they are also well structured and easy to cultivate. 
Productivity is mainly limited by the lack of rainfall. 
Agriculture in Ukraine
Ukraine’s agriculture is primarily specialized in arable crop 
production, whose gross output value currently is more than 
Figure 2. Ukraine topography, main cities and neighbors
Figure 3. Climatic zones of Ukraine 
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S o m e  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  U k r a i n e ’ s  e c o n o m y
twice the level of livestock production. Central districts have 
the highest crop yields, particularly those situated along the 
northern part of the Steppes zone and the southern part 
of Forest steppe, where up to 85% of total land is now in 
use as arable land.1  However, this also is the area where 
land erosion is most severe and nutrient mining is most 
pronounced, as will be seen in Section 8. Animal husbandry 
is mainly concentrated around the agglomerations of Kiev, 
and Lvov, as well as in the relatively urbanized Donetsk 
basin. 
Overall, climatic and soil conditions are quite suitable 
for cultivation of arable crops, and the largest part of 
agricultural land is used for crop production (32 mln ha), 
whereas hay and pastures cover 8 mln ha. During the 
transitional period 1990-2000, total sown area of the main 
agricultural crops decreased significantly by about 5 mln ha, 
but since 2000 a stable level of around 27 mln ha has been 
maintained. The share of grains and in particular industrial 
crops increased, however, at the expense of fodder crops, 
1 Ukraine Statistical Yearbook 2011, chapter 9.
reflecting a transition to crops with higher returns. Figure 4 
shows the shift during the past decade.
The livestock sector decreased sharply after the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and has not recovered completely, so 
Ukraine still imports about 15% of its meat consumption. 
For an overview of its agricultural production, see Figure 5.
Grain exports have been rising fast in recent years, and 
are now around 20 mln ton. Also for the harvesting year of 
2012/13 exports are expected to be close to 21 mln tons 
(that is 7 % of the world trade in grains, excluding rice) and 
2.6 mln tons of oilseeds (that is 2% of world trade), according 
to the November 2012 issue of FAO’s Food Outlook. Ukraine 
intends to consolidate and expand its export position and has 
in this connection made efforts to improve its trade relations.
Figure 4. Shift in sown area of main agricultural crops
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Agriculture in Ukraine, Statistical Yearbook 2011
Figure 5. Production structure of agriculture in Ukraine (average over 2008-2010)
Source: FAOSTAT
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Independence and Transition
Ukraine, with a GDP per capita of € 2 799 in 2011 is a 
lower middle-income country.2 At the breaking up of the 
Soviet Union in 1990 it inherited a fair share of industrial 
assets and natural wealth, primarily consisting, besides land, 
of mineral reserves, particularly coal and iron ore but also 
manganese, titanium and nickel.
The transition has proved difficult. After a few years of 
economic reorientation and significant drop in economic 
activity, the country achieved a period of steady growth 
for almost a decade (see Figure 6). However, clear internal 
tensions remained between orientation towards Russia 
and the West, that built up after the Orange Revolution in 
2004, with subsequent talks of Ukraine joining NATO, and 
culminated in 2008 when Ukraine chose Georgia’s side in its 
conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. Soon after, a dispute 
emerged about Russia’s gas deliveries to and transport 
through Ukraine that almost brought the energy intensive 
industry to a standstill. Amidst these tensions and reinforced 
2 Based on per capita GDP of 3615 USD (World Bank) and the annual USD/EUR 
exchange rate of .7742
by the financial crisis, tourism from Russia to the Carpathians 
and primarily Crimea declined. In all, the economy contracted 
by 15% in 2009.
The political tensions have relented since the 2010 change in 
government, and economic growth picked up at a steady rate 
of around 5%, which is also the forecast for 2012, with an 
equally steady exchange rate since the beginning of 2009, 
see Figure 7. According to statistics from the World Tourist 
Organization, after a decline in 2009 of almost one million 
visitors, tourist flows had more or less returned to previous 
levels by 2010 and resumed their growth in 2011.
Relations with EU
Ukraine clearly has strong cultural and economic ties with 
Russia. At present, it imports most of its energy from Russia, 
but also shares borders with four EU member states and 
participates in the EU Neighborhood Policy programs, which 
aim at deepening the relationship between the EU and its 
neighbors. Through various action plans, the EU has become 
Ukraine’s largest foreign donor. Investing a cumulative total 
of almost 6 billion Euros since 1992, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has maintained 
a diversified portfolio of projects in the country, in areas 
such as micro-enterprise lending, financial sector reform, 
rehabilitation of infrastructure and rationalization of the 
energy sector.3
Ukraine also started negotiations with the EU on the 
establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA), a treaty that would cover all trade-related fields 
(including services, IPR, customs, public procurement, and 
competition) and would also address trade-related domestic 
regulations in Ukraine that may conflict with the Acquis 
Communautaire. Ukraine’s agricultural trade with the EU is 
currently subject to tariff-rate quotas (in particular for low 
quality wheat) and has to meet the EU’s SPS requirements, 
3 http : / /www.ebrd .com/downloads/country /st rategy/ukra ine_country_
strategy_2011_2014.pdf
Figure 6.  GDP growth rate and levels, 1990-2012
Source: World Bank Indicators (forecasts for 2012)
Figure 7.   Monthly exchange rate between UAH 
(Ukrainian Hryvnia) and Euro, 2000-2012
Note: In July 2012 1 Hryvnia converts to .099 euro (data from www.oanda.com)
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which is constraining the exports of higher valued crops such 
as fruits and vegetables. 
Trade
Ukraine typically exports iron and steel to the EU and Russia, 
which are its main trading partners. Russia also imports 
rolling stocks such as railways equipment. Exports of the 
heavy industry suff ered severely during the 2009-recession, 
but also recovered quickly, see Figure 8. Agricultural exports 
to the EU (dominated by oilseeds and its oils and cereals, 
mainly for use as animal feed and as biofuel) prove to be 
less volatile.
Around 2005, when world commodity prices started rising, 
the external balance of Ukraine turned into a defi cit, steadily 
increasing to levels that now exceed 7.5 bln Euro, as higher 
steel and grain prices could not compensate for the rise in 
the energy bill. Given its strong market exposure, with high 
import values as well as high export values, and its focus 
on primary commodities with relatively little processing, 
variable world prices also transmit heavily into the domestic 
economy, compromising its economic stability. 
At the same time, persistence of the upward shift  (see Figure 
9) in world agricultural prices on average, as compared to 
the level in the previous decade, suggests that there may 
be good opportunities for Ukraine to boost the value of its 
agricultural exports.
On the import side, exposure has worsened signifi cantly 
since Russia cancelled its preferential agreements for sale 
of oil and gas in 2006, leaving the Government of Ukraine no 
choice but allowing domestic energy prices to rise gradually 
to reach world market level eventually. This controlled 
increase aims to prevent fast erosion of purchasing power 
among large segments of the population, and of the 
competitiveness of the (heavy) industry in one of the most 
energy intensive economies of the world. The impact on 
consumer prices was signifi cant, nonetheless. While in 2006 
prices in most commodity groups were stable or increased 
by 5% at most, the price for electricity rose by 50%, for gas 
by 80% and for central heating by more than 100%.4 
Ukraine’s contribution to global food security
As a major agricultural exporter, Ukraine is an important 
player on world food markets that is to be reckoned with 
already.  Its stationary population and relatively low crop 
yields leave ample room for improvement. The country’s 
impact on the global food scene can only be predicted to 
4 Source: Consumer price indices for goods and services in 2006, State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine.
S o m e  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  U k r a i n e ’ s  e c o n o m y
Figure 8. Ukrainian exports to Russia and EU-27, 2004-2011
Note: Only the four top exports groups are shown, covering 85% of total Ukrainian exports.
SITC 1: Food and live animals, SITC 2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels, SITC 7: Machinery and transport equipment, SITC 8: Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles
Source: Trademap database of International Trade Centre, Geneva
Figure 9. International cereal prices, 2000-2012, in 
US$ per ton
Source: IMF price statistics.
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become more pronounced in the future, as the need becomes 
more pressing to feed and clothe nine billion people in 2050 
who consume more meat and crops, particularly if authorities 
worldwide persist on using food crops as fuel.
Ukraine impacts by more than its export potential alone. Its 
trade policies and product composition play an important 
role as well, particularly since price volatility on world food 
markets has risen significantly in the past decade. This 
change is attributable to several primary and secondary 
drivers. Ukraine has a distinct role in both.
The primary drivers are weather shocks and consequent 
output variations. Ukraine is under a strong impact here, 
because of its frost and drought sensitive conditions, and 
its limitations in managing irrigation, storage, and plant 
protection.
Non-negligible shocks originate from linking agricultural and 
energy markets (the secondary drivers). One channel for this 
is the cost of production, whereby fuel cost is transmitted to 
final product price of agricultural products with high supply 
elasticity, such as horticultural and livestock products (unlike 
field crops). Biofuel is a second channel of transmission. 
Since 2004 many countries including the US, EU and China5 
have started promoting use of biofuel in cars through direct 
support and blending mandates. Until January 2012 the 
US provided a subsidy on biofuel output to make it equally 
profitable, causing food prices to follow the highly volatile 
fossil fuel prices, especially during the period of 2010-2011.6 
Also with respect to biofuels, countries that do not offer a 
direct subsidy, may impose a blending mandate (a minimum 
percentage of biofuel in gasoline). While this does not 
establish a direct link to the fuel price, it introduces an 
almost price inelastic demand component. Starting 2012, 
the US abolished the price subsidy and border protection 
on biofuels, leaving only a general subsidy (including tax 
breaks) for biofuel plants, and an overall delivery quota, 
to be fulfilled either from direct production or from biofuel 
stocks. Basically this means that the blending mandate, like 
in other countries, now imposes a lower bound on demand 
for biofuel crops, that is, except for biofuel stock adjustment, 
hardly responsive to crop prices. With 40% of US corn output 
used as biofuel this significantly reduces demand elasticity 
and after the drought in 2012, jointly with the rigid mandates 
of other countries, amplified the price hike on world markets.
Three mechanisms may help addressing the impact of 
energy markets on agricultural markets. First, the processing 
industry itself can substitute food and fuel based on relative 
profitability, as the Brazil sugar-ethanol plants are very apt 
to do, which of course strengthens the link between food 
5 Sorda, G., M.Banse and C. Kemfert (2010) An overview of biofuel policies across the 
world, Energy Journal 38: 6977-88.
6 In 2009 the US car fleet had reached saturation, hitting the so-called blend wall, 
and temporarily  delinking crop and fuel markets. By the end of 2012 the blend wall 
has been reached again. It is expected to remain binding in the coming years. 
and fuel prices. Second, adjustment and arbitrage on biofuel 
stocks can reduce temporary variations, which may soften 
food price variations, a little. Third, temporary waivers on 
mandates have been suggested to deal with scarcity. In the 
US, various organizations have in the fall of 2012 called 
upon the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency 
in charge, to act accordingly but the decision is still pending. 7 
It would seem that in such a highly regulated industry, some 
international coordination is required both to intervene in 
crisis situations and to avoid excess production capacity. 
If such international coordination could be agreed upon, it 
would guide Ukraine, just as the other countries, in their 
decisions about investing in biofuel production, and avoid 
becoming part of a race to the bottom between highly 
subsidized biofuel plants worldwide. Nonetheless, given the 
current doubts about biofuels, it would seem that investments 
into biofuel production capacity are unlikely to pay off in the 
longer run, particularly due to presence of highly subsidized 
biofuel plants worldwide. A more promising direction would 
be to invest in meeting SPS-measures for food. Then, with a 
limited capacity in biofuel production and the SPS satisfied, 
Ukraine could through well-regulated waivers start playing 
a pivotal role on grain markets and help reducing price 
volatility. 
Finally, turning to another secondary driver, we note that 
Ukraine had no special part in the deficiencies of financial 
markets that incited to speculation, particularly during the 
period 2006-2010 when future prices failed to convergence 
to spot prices upon expiration of contracts. However, it did 
worsen price volatility when it imposed export quotas, an 
issue to which we return in Section 6 below.
 
Population and labor force
The difficulties of transition also find expression in a population 
decline that started in 1993 and has never stopped since, 
dropping from 51.5 mln people at the time to 45 mln in 
2012.8 Fertility is below reproduction level, and mortality 
of adult men of working age is extremely high. Overall life 
expectancy is less than seventy years, ten years shorter for 
men, which is low for a lower middle-income country, and 
causes both rural and urban population numbers to fall. High 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS and abuse of alcohol and drugs are 
major threats in this regard. At the same time, literacy rates 
and education levels are one of the highest in the world, 
as shown by the Human Development Index reported by the 
UNDP. 
The service sector is Ukraine’s largest employer (around 
60% of total work force, see Figure 10), but the shares 
7 EPRINC(2012) Ethanol’s lost promise. An Assessment of the Economic 
Consequences of the Renewable Fuels Mandate, Energy Policy Research Foundation, 
Inc. (EPRINC), Washington DC.
8 Source: FAOSTAT, Resources
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of manufacturing and agriculture are still substantial. 
These data exclude a presumably large shadow economy, 
estimated by the World Bank at 55% of GDP on average over 
the period 1999-2007. About five million people may well be 
employed in the informal sector, mostly in rural areas.
 
S o m e  b a c k g r o u n d  o n  U k r a i n e ’ s  e c o n o m y
Figure 10.   Employment shares, 2001-2008, as % 
of total employment
Source: World Bank Indicators
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Following the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine’s agriculture 
underwent a transition to a market economy characterized 
by instability, uncertainty, permanent economic crisis 
and political standoff, in the middle of which the official 
institutions remained more or less unchanged with respect 
to their governance and internal culture of administration.
The transition can be subdivided into three stages: 9 1991-
1999; 2000-2003; 2004-present.10 
First stage: 1990-1999
The first stage created the main preconditions for 
reorganization of collective and state enterprises and 
privatization of their land and other property. Collective and 
state farms were transformed into collective agricultural 
enterprises (CAE) initially owned by their employees as 
shareholders, who received land certificates among others, 
and became entitled to start a private farm. 
Attempts to set up private farms were, however, impeded by 
the people’s inexperience in independent farm management, 
lack of theoretical and practical knowledge of launching 
private business in a transitional economy, unfavorable 
economic situation in the country, and to some extent by an 
unfavorable attitude on the part of government officials and 
of rural communities. By the end of 1999 no more than 10% 
of agricultural enterprises had effectively been reorganized.11 
Reform of the market regimes was slow as well. For 
example, until 1997 Soviet practices of State procurement 
of agricultural products remained operational, usually in the 
form of interest-free state loans at regulated prices. 
9 Actual Problems of Agrarian Reform in Ukraine in Time of Systemic Economic Crisis 
/ed. I.G. Kyrylenko, UN Development Programme, 2009 , p. 24. (Available in Ukrainian 
at: http://brc.undp.org.ua/img/publications/AgroReform2009_Ukr.pdf
10 It is common to distinguish two periods only: 1990-1999; 2000-present only, e.g. 
Andrea Zimmerman, Arnim Kuhn (2006). Impact of Agricultural Policy Reforms on 
Farm Structures and Performance in Ukraine. Prepared for 96th EAAE Seminar “Causes 
and Impacts of Agricultural Structures” 10-11 January 2006, Tänikon, Switzerland. 
Available at: http://www.ilr1.uni-bonn.de/agpo/staff/zimmermann/Ukraine.pdf
11 Source: Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine.
Given the permanent inflation, and even spells of 
hyperinflation in 1992-1993, this price rigidity caused the 
agricultural terms of trade to worsen dramatically and at 
unprecedented rate. While in 1990 the price of 1 mt (metric 
ton) of diesel fuel was equivalent to the price of 0.2 mt of 
wheat, by 2003 it was already 4.6 mt, and by 2004, 6.0 mt.12 
Mineral fertilizer and other inputs showed similar price rises. 
The terms of trade have improved since, but the relative 
price of diesel to wheat is still a factor of 7.  
These unfavorable developments during the period 1990-
1999 led to a sharp decrease of agricultural output, dividing 
gross agricultural product by half. For agricultural enterprises, 
it dropped to 28% of the 1990 level, while households were 
able to maintain their production more or less unchanged, at 
98% of the 1990 level.13
Second stage: 2000-2003
By December 2000 the preceding downturn led to adoption 
in Parliament of a Presidential Decree “On urgent measures 
regarding acceleration of the agricultural sector of economy” 
that marked the start of the second stage. The Decree 
effectuated the actual privatization of agricultural land, 
stipulating that land shares had to be transformed into 
private land plots with well defined physical boundaries. 
This implied first that land lease based on land certificates 
became possible and secondly that on part of the land the 
holders of a certificate were given the right to claim land 
plots up to 100 ha but usually less to farm on by themselves. 
The institutional changes were significant. Collective 
enterprises were liquidated and their assets distributed. 
12 Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
13 Calculated according to the data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
Agriculture of Ukraine 2000: Statistical Yearbook,  State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 
2011.
E m e r g e n c e  o f  a  d u a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s y s t e m
3.  Emergence of a dual 
agricultural system
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A variety of new production entities emerged including 
limited liability companies, private farms, agricultural 
production cooperatives, open and closed joint stock 
companies, and household plots. 
In all, this process of restructuring eventually created a dual 
production structure consisting of large corporate holdings 
(agricultural enterprises) and individual farms (peasant 
farms and households).14
In parallel with these organizational changes at farm level 
the regimes prevailing on agricultural markets were modified, 
with more price flexibility allowing for improved terms of 
trade for agriculture. 
Yet, after the disastrous first stage of agricultural 
transition, government policy was now primarily oriented 
on revival of large scale production. Along with traditional 
subsidies for production, so-called “soft” loans (with 
partial reimbursement of interest payments), there was a 
price support through assured procurement of grain and 
government interventions, low leasing rates for equipment, 
supplies of fuel and fertilizers at prices below market level 
and tax holidays.
14  All households that possess land plots and carry out some agricultural activityin 
both rural and urban areas.
However, access to these benefits was reserved to large 
producers only. In 2001 about 12 600 enterprises received 
over UAH 5 billion of lending funds, which were allocated to 
agriculture, of which UAH 2.6 billion were “soft” loans (at a 
lower interest rate).15
Third stage 2004-present
The third stage is characterized by intensification of 
agricultural production based on concentration of land and 
assets, by consolidation into large holdings.16 This process 
largely takes place in the shadow, and is made possible by 
non-transparent control over the distribution of the former 
collective enterprises’ property and agricultural lands, 
and the emergence of an informal land market, whereby 
lease, lease-to-purchase and purchase agreements led to 
consolidation of large stretches of farmland in the hands 
of vertically integrated legal entities and natural persons. 
Hundred thousands of hectares of consolidated land are now 
being cultivated as export-oriented corporations. These are 
often of latifundium type. Thanks to their access to advanced 
modes of finance they were able to initiate diversified 
activities along the full product chain from input supply, 
basic crop production through processing and even exports.
15 According to the Report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. Available at: http://
www.ac-rada.gov.ua/control/main/uk/publish/article/40371?cat_id=38965
16  O. Borodina (2007). Peculiarities of creation of extra large agricultural companies 
under conditions of insufficient legislative regulation in Ukraine. Paper prepared for 
presentation at the 102 EAAE Seminar “Superlarge farming companies in Eastern 
Europe:emergence and possible impact”. Moscow, May 17-18, 2007, http://agecon.lib.
umn.edu/cgi-bin/view.pl.
Table 1.  Agricultural producers in Ukraine, 2000-2010
Classes, organizational and legal forms 2000 2005 2010
Number % Number % Number %
Corporate farms
Agricultural enterprises  – total number 13 160 100.0 15 430 100.0 14 767 100.0
including: Partnerships 6 718 51.1 7 900 51.2 7 769 52.6
                    Private enterprises 2 519 19.1 4 123 26.7 4 243 28.7
                    Cooperatives 3 136 23.8 1 521 9.9 952 6.5
                    State enterprises 385 2.9 386 2.5 322 2.2
                    Others 402 3.1 1 500 9.7 1 481 10.0
Individual farms
1. Peasant farms – units, 1000 34.8 42.4 41.7
2. Household plots – units, 1000 … 4 915.3 4 540.4
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine
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Present state of dualisation
Through its dual production structure, the agricultural sector 
of Ukraine is currently subdivided into large corporate farms 
and by comparison small individual farms that range from 
household plots to farm cooperatives jointly operated by a 
few families and small corporations.
Corporate farms include various organizational and legal 
entities established in accordance with the legislation 
of Ukraine: state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, 
economic partnerships, production cooperatives and others. 
They have the status of legal entity and carry out agricultural 
production. In 2010 there were 14 800 corporate farms. 
Their distribution by numbers and composition is shown in 
Table 1.
Within the group of corporate farms, the group that cultivates 
more than 10 000 ha has grown significantly since 2004, 
more than threefold in 2010, on an area that was multiplied 
by four, as the average size of holdings rose by 31% to 
almost 22 000 ha. 
This trend towards extreme concentration of land is still 
going on in 2012, as large farms merge further to mega 
agro-holdings that have considerable power through their 
land size, assets and access to financial resources, locally as 
well as nationally. It may be added that these mergers are 
often not free from coercion. 
The agro-holding has by now become the centralized form of 
agribusiness organization with the parent company owning 
and managing a number of subsidiaries. Operating as profit 
maximization corporations, they attract risk bearing capital 
from stock exchanges worldwide, albeit foreign investors 
have become less eager in recent years in view of the large 
supply of Ukrainian shares and the legal uncertainties in 
Ukraine.
Examples of such holdings are: “Ukrainian Agrarian 
Investments” (330 000 ha), “MMK named after Iliich” (225 
000 ha), “Mria agroholding” (218 000 ha), State Enterprise 
“Nafkom-Agro” (200 000 ha), “Astarta-Kyiv” (185 000 ha, 
which plans to expand shortly its land base to 400 000 
ha), “Mironovski Khliboproduct” (180 000 ha), “Agroton” 
(150 000 ha), “Ukrzernoprom-Agro” (96 000 ha), “Sintal-D” 
(94 000 ha) and others. In 2010, the 40 largest holdings 
controlled 4.5 million ha of land, which accounts for 11% of 
agricultural land.17 
Large corporations and mega agro-holdings rarely register 
their business as such in Ukraine, as they prefer off-shore 
registration to benefit from tax exemptions. This makes it 
difficult to track and to measure statistically their emergence 
and dynamics. Ukraine could improve the governance of 
these flows and its finances by setting up an agro-exchange, 
possibly as subsidiary of an existing and well-reputed 
commodity exchange. Such an exchange might also promote 
certification of the social and environmental requirements 
imposed on the production. 
17  The rise of large farms in land abundant countries (2011), Policy Research Working 
Paper of the World Bank (WPS5588)
E m e r g e n c e  o f  a  d u a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s y s t e m
Table 2. Distribution of different types of farms by agricultural land size in 2010
Corporate farms 
(agricultural enterprises) Individual farms
Farm size, ha
Share , % Peasant farms Household plots 
In total 
number
In 
land 
area
Farm size, 
ha
Share, %
Farm size, 
ha
Share, %
In total 
number
In land 
area
In total 
number
In land 
area
< 1000 45.0 11.6 <50 64.6 14.2 < 0.25 25.2 3.3
1000-4000 26.1 46.9 50-100 9.8 6.8 0.25-1.0 53.0 24.4
4000-10000 5.5 27.3 100-500 10.9 24.3 1.01-5.0 18.5 30.4
> 10000 0.9 14.2 500-1000 2.4 16.5 5.01-10.0 2.0 11.8
without land* 22.5 – > 1000 1.9 38.2 > 10.0 1.3 30.1
without land* 10.4 –
Total 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
Note: *without agricultural land
JRC80164 IPTS Farming and rural development in Ukraine making dualisation work.indd   23 07/05/13   17:36
F a r m i n g  a n d  r u r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  U k r a i n e :  m a k i n g  d u a l i s a t i o n  w o r k
24
Individual farms comprise two types of individual-owned 
farms: peasant farms and household plots.
Peasant farms are formed by a collective of citizens from 
rural areas. They have the status of legal entity with the 
main focus on agriculture production activity. They also may 
carry out processing, marketing and sales for own profits 
on the land plots given them free of charge for farming. In 
2010 there were 41 700 peasants farms (Table 1).
Household plots are basic farms operated by individual 
households that carry out agricultural production for own 
consumption as well as for the market. About 9.4 million 
households have land plots for cultivation.18 These plots are 
located in both the countryside and urban areas (cities and 
towns). There are 4.5 million of such plots, meaning that 
many households operate one plot jointly (Table 1). The 
households receive these plots “for individual agriculture 
activity” under a special Law. The legal norm for the size 
of land holding is 2 ha, but households that had a land 
certificate may cultivate a far larger area.
Within both groups – corporate and individual farms – the 
size of farms varies significantly: 45% of corporate farms 
below 1 000 ha cultivate  11.6% of farmland, and 0.9% of 
farms with more than 10 000 thousand ha cultivate 14.2% 
of farmland.  Distribution of corporate and individual farms 
by their land size is presented in Table 2 but it must be 
18  Statistical Yearbook «Social and economic characteristics of households in Ukraine 
in 2010». State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2010. Data on land plots of households 
available at: http://ukrstat.org/uk/operativ/operativ2010/gdn/sdh/dod_08.htm. 
stressed that these corporate farms can be subsidiaries of 
much larger agro-holdings.
Farms without land tend to be engaged in livestock and 
poultry production. For corporate farms these are intensive 
livestock units specialized in poultry, beef and pork production. 
As to the peasant farms, it may be mentioned that some of 
these rent out their land and are not involved in agricultural 
activity at present.
 Developments on agricultural markets 
While maintaining procurement at fixed prices in rural 
areas, the first (1990-1999) stage of the transition opened 
domestic markets for imports of relatively poor quality 
product at low prices. This was necessary to meet the supply 
shortages but it also discouraged domestic production. As 
domestic production recovered during the second stage 
agricultural imports were reduced.
In the third stage, agroholdings, which integrated production, 
processing, marketing and sales seized significant market 
power. By monopolizing sales channels they were able to cut 
off individual farms and even some corporate farms from 
direct access to domestic as well as international markets.
There are both technical and institutional reasons for 
this. Regarding the former, the marketing chains are 
underdeveloped and not accessible to all, particularly for 
wholesale trade and processing of fresh and cold products 
(fruits and vegetables, milk and meat, etc.). Regarding the 
latter, restrictive licensing practices by government and 
Table 3.  Share of different types of farms in agricultural production, %
Indicator 
Corporate farms
Individual farms
Peasant farms Households
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Gross agricultural output 
(value) 32.3 39.9 1.7 5.0 66.0 55.1
Production (quantity)
Grain and leguminous crops 76.5 63.8 5.1 12.0 18.4 24.2
Sunflower seed 77.5 64.7 10.0 17.8 12.5 17.5
Rapeseed 96.0 85.0 4.0 15.0 – –
Sugar beet (for processing) 82.1 83.7 5.7   8.4 12.2   7.9
Potatoes 1.1 1.7 0.3   0.9 98.6 97.4
Vegetables 15.5 9.3 1.4  2.6 83.1 88.1
Fruits and berries 18.2 16.4 - - 81.8 83.6
All types of meat 25.8 52.8 0.5  2.3 73.7 44.9
All types of milk 28.5 18.7 0.5  1.0 71.0 80.3
Eggs 33.7 59.6 0.1  0.5 66.2 39.9
Honey 6.6 2.0 0.2  0.3 93.2 97.7
Wool 38.3 13.8 0.3  3.1 61.4 83.1
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
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state trading companies have made agricultural trade highly 
dependent on lobbying by agroholdings and other interest 
groups. This obviously distorts agricultural markets very 
much.
For example, the “sale mechanisms” set up by large grain 
traders permits earning stable profits from export crops 
(grains, sunflower, rapeseed, etc.) causing the rapeseed area 
to skyrocket both in the corporate and the individual farms 
in practically all regions of Ukraine, substituting food crops 
in the fertile central regions of Ukraine, and even moving into 
the southern regions close to harbors, which is potentially 
risky as the crop is less suited to the weather conditions in 
this region.
Generally, the poor state of market infrastructure in Ukraine 
led to a dualisation of the marketing spheres between 
corporate and individual farms. Corporate farms supply 
mostly commercially attractive and export-oriented products, 
while individual farms mainly supply food for the domestic 
market, contributing about 60% to the gross product in 
agriculture (see Table 3). 
E m e r g e n c e  o f  a  d u a l  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s y s t e m
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Weather risk
Despite its favorable agro-ecological conditions, Ukraine 
faces weather risks of two kinds. 
One is drought. A recent study by Khokhlov et al. (2012) 19 on 
the spatiotemporal distribution of droughts in Ukraine over a 
period of 60 years (1950-2009) has shown that the number 
of abnormally dry summers and winters have increased in 
some regions of Ukraine. There is in particular a trend toward 
increasing droughts in the southern regions that is getting 
more pronounced starting from second half of the 1990s. 
Recent statistics and media reports confirm that droughts 
have had a significant impact on agricultural production in 
the past years. For example, winter wheat output dropped 
by 20% in 2010 resulting in decreasing exports (2.5 million 
tons in the second half of the year, compared to 21 million 
tons in the first half) and rising grain prices. Also in 2011 
and 2012 droughts damaged about a third of the country’s 
winter grains, as seedlings did not appear on significant 
shares of the sown areas (in total, plants failed to sprout on 
1.4 million hectares).
The other risk is frost and snow mold that particularly 
threaten wheat production, since 95% of it is winter wheat. 
In 2003 frost and snow mold annihilated half of the planted 
territory causing wheat production to drop to less than 5 
mln tons, from the usual range of 15-20 mln tons. Figure 11 
shows the consequent variability of cereals output.
Ukraine’s agriculture would benefit from adoption of varieties 
and farming practices that are less vulnerable to these risks 
and in the dry areas in the South from rehabilitation of 
irrigation systems. Programs that return land to nature and 
afforestation could also avoid this.
19 Khokhlov, V., Yermolenko, N. and Ivanov, A. (2012): Spatiotemporal features of 
droughts in Ukraine under climate change. Paper prepared for the Workshop on the 
Development of an Experimental Global Drought Information System (GDIS), 11-13 
April 2012, Frascati , Italy.
Yields well below their agro-ecological potential 
Even in good years, yields remain low relative to the agro-
ecological potential and also relative to what has been 
achieved in the past and is currently achieved elsewhere. 
Estimates based on detailed agro-ecological information, 
under the assumption of optimal input use and management, 
show that winter wheat can reach 7 ton/ha, which is 4 tons 
above the present level.20 
The yield gap is in part explained by the presently low 
application of fertilizer, 2.5 times less in 2010 than in 1990 
(see Table 4), with a bottom level in 2000. 
20  Gumeniuk, K.,N.  Mischnenko, G. Fischer, H. van Velthuizen (2010) Agro-ecological 
assessment for the transition of the agricultural sector in Ukraine. Methodology 
and results for base line climate, IIASA, Austria. This study also provides the spatial 
distribution of optimal yields over the country, see Figures 3.2 and 3.4.
I s s u e s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n :  y i e l d s
4.  Issues in agricultural 
production: yields
Figure 11.  Variability of cereals production in 
Ukraine, 2000-2010
Source: FAOSTAT
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The table shows that Nitrogen/Phosphorus/Potash 
proportions seem to have been unbalanced in 1990 already, 
and do not follow the fertilizer recommendations for Ukraine 
21, nor the agronomic practice that Nitrogen should be 
applied for uptake by the plant itself, but that Phosphorus 
and Potash primarily serve to maintain recommended stock 
levels in the soils. Hence, on fertile soils it will be possible to 
obtain adequate yields for decades that are based on mining 
of the Phosphorus, Potash and micronutrient reserves in the 
soils. It would seem that Ukraine has followed this practice 
and that its fertile soils have been and are still being mined 
heavily, presumably in an unsustainable way.
Furthermore, use of organic fertilizers has dropped 
significantly. This is because livestock herds have not yet 
21  See FAO (2005) Fertilizer Use by Crop in Ukraine, recommending the overall ratio 
should be 2:1:1.
recovered from the reductions of the early 1990s, and 
because farming practices hardly rely on green fertilizers, 
leguminous crops and plowing of crop residuals.
For households and individual farms financing and 
marketing constraints may explain the lack of incentives 
to achieve higher yields. More remarkably, corporate farms 
are not more successful in this respect despite their better 
capitalization and access to export and input chains. A quick 
survey of the most important agri-business farms (including 
Kernel, with 210 000 ha of land, Astarta Holding with 250 
000 ha, Agroliga Group with 7 000 ha, Mriya with 295 000 
ha) reveals that this may be due to their primary focus on 
keeping production costs low rather than investing more. 
Table 4.   Mineral and organic fertilizer application by agricultural enterprises, 1990 – 2010
Characteristic 1990 2000 2009 2010
Applied mineral fertilizers in nutrients kg per ha 141 13 48 58
Proportion nitrogenous: phosphoric : potash fertilizers 1:0.7:0.7 1:0.2:0.1 1:0.2:0.2 1:0.2:0.2
Applied organic fertilizers tons per ha 8.6 1.3 0.6 0.5
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine
Table 5.  Average revenues and costs by crop of agricultural enterprises in UAH/ha
Agricultural products Input costs (UAH/ha)
Gross revenues
(UAH/ha)
Net revenues
(UAH/ha)
Grains and leguminous crops – total  2 634  3 891  1 257
incl.:
Winter wheat  2 487  3 414    927
Spring wheat  1 985  2 543    558
Rye  1 194  1 537   343
Maize for grain  3 998  6 576 2 578
Winter barley  1 940  2 590    650
Spring barley  1 630  2 178    548
Oats    785  1 096    311
Sunflower  2 743  4 972 2 229
Soya  2 792  4 120 1 328
Winter rape  3 855  6 017 2 162
Spring rape  3 426  4 746 1 320
Sugar beet  5 257  8 195 2 938
Potato 19 726 26 400 6 674
Vegetable grown in open 15 092 20 517 5 425
Greenhouse vegetables 1 830 000 2 300 000 470 000
Source: own calculation based on Survey of Agricultural Enterprises (2011).
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Net revenues per hectare are low compared to the EU 
Low farm-gate prices and low yields lead to low profitability 
per hectare. The annual Survey of Agricultural Enterprises 
confirms this and also provides quantitative information, by 
crop and by input. Table 5 summarizes the results based upon 
a sample which covers 15% of the agricultural enterprises 
in Ukraine, covering 9.5 mln ha (that is 30% of arable land). 
The input costs cover all current inputs (feed, seed, fertilizer, 
fuel, small materials) and also a component for labor costs. 
Gross revenues for, say, wheat are in the range of 340 €/
ha (at current exchange rates), which is indeed compatible 
with an average yield of approximately 3 ton/ha and a farm-
gate price of 100 €/ton. Input costs are relatively high, which 
results in net revenues of less than 100 €/ha. Apart from 
the labor costs this indicator is comparable to the standard 
gross margin as computed in the EU, based on data from 
the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). Typically, high 
yielding farms in Western Europe have margins for wheat in 
the range of 1000-1200 €/ha. 
I s s u e s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n :  y i e l d s
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Ukraine has private ownership of agricultural land but with 
strict rules on land access and land use. Sale and purchase 
of agricultural land in Ukraine is strictly prohibited by the 
so-called Land Moratorium (“Zemelnyi codex”), which was 
instituted in the early 1990s and developed by further 
legislation. The basic principles are as follows:
 - Rural and urban households who own land for subsistence 
farming purposes (own gardens to produce fruits and 
vegetables) from the pre-reform times have the right to 
sell these plots, since they do not fall under the “agricultural 
land” category, but are classified as “household plots”  that 
can cover up to two hectares or in some cases more. 
 - Land that had previously been cultivated by the state and 
collective farms has been privatized in the 1990s, i.e. split 
and distributed among the eligible population. Eligible 
people were in the first instance the workers who had 
been employed by the collective farms, and in the second 
instance employees in the social service sector (teachers, 
medical staff) who lived and worked within the rural 
council where the farms were located. On record is the 
land of a farm of 2 000 ha that was distributed equally 
among 400 eligible persons. The average land size thus 
given to a single individual was about 3-5 ha. If more than 
one person per household was eligible, each received their 
share.
 - Only natural persons can own land, not legal entities 
(organizations, enterprises). Foreigners do not have the 
rights to own land in Ukraine. Land ownership is granted 
only if certain conditions were fulfilled, such as permanent 
residence in the vicinity. 
 - The maximum land size an individual can own is no 
more than 100 ha. The maximum land size an individual 
can lease is no more than 6 000 ha, or 5% of the total 
agricultural area in the region (oblast). If more than the 
maximum amount of 100 ha is in the possession of an 
individual (e.g. through inheritance), the individual is 
obliged to dispose of the excess land within one year.
 - A small share of the land (around 5-10%) was reserved for 
the state (state property and reserves). This was usually 
land of low productivity that was reserved to be given to 
individuals wishing to become farmers.
 - There are also property titles on real estate that define 
passage rights for traffic and for water that can be 
established by a contract, by law, a will, or a court order, 
conditional on payment or free, temporary or permanent. 
For traffic (vehicle or cattle) the rights apply to existing 
roads. For water there are rights to connect for diversion 
or extraction of water to another natural reservoir, with 
connections passing through adjacent land owned by 
others, rights to water livestock at a natural reservoir 
located on adjacent land, and the right to drive cattle 
through a natural body of water.
Impact of the legal regulation on the land lease market
 - The legislation is still under construction, which is one 
of the reasons for the repeated prolongation of the 
moratorium. Three laws are under revision now: Law on 
land market, Law on the agricultural bank, and Law on 
public and communal property.
 - At the time of the distribution of agricultural land in the 
1990s, eligible individuals received a “certificate” stating 
the personal details of the owner, and the size of land that 
he/she owned, without further specifying the exact location 
of that land. Since the actual location was unspecified, 
individuals could not cultivate them and had no other 
choice than leasing collectively to the larger holdings 
operating the full parcel.
 - In response to this problem, a cadastre was set up and 
certificates were gradually replaced by the “Zemelnyi 
Act”, a document that specified the land property as well 
I s s u e s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n :
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access to agricultural land and 
the Land Moratorium
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as defined parcels on the cadastral map. The process of 
shifting from the certificates to the acts took long, due to 
high transaction costs, with a registration fee of about 75€ 
per parcel! Nonetheless, as much as around 90% of all 
land is currently covered by the Acts. 
 - These greatly improved titles to land were, however, 
insufficient enticement for the population to farm these 
parcels, among others due to their inaccessibility. Large 
farms were simply divided and distributed geometrically, 
without attention to road infrastructure. In particular, 
the Law does not regulate the right of passage across 
adjacent parcels in the absence of a road, a vital element 
of any agricultural operation to bring in inputs, laborers 
and equipment and to move out the produce at harvest. 
 - Lease contracts can have duration of up to 50 years. 
Payments can be in cash and in kind. Rent is paid annually 
or at the beginning of the contract for the full period.
 - Consequently, most parcels are still being leased to large 
farms that know the law better and also enjoy monopsony 
regarding the terms of lease.  Households have little 
alternatives. Hence almost all (99%) of rented land 
currently is from private households and substantiated by 
certificates and acts.
 - There are currently only around 40 000 peasant farmers 
(carrying that official status), i.e. households who did 
actually started cultivating their land rather than leasing it.
 - To terminate a lease contract, owners need to start, at their 
own expenses, court proceedings that can only succeed in 
principle, if the farm holding which rented land failed to 
fulfill the conditions specified in the contract (irregular or 
insufficient). In practice courts usually take no action, with 
the motivation that there was no systematic fraud.
 - Even though sale and purchase of land are prohibited, 
corporate farms make frequent use of loopholes:
(a) The enterprise pays the whole amount of the rent 
in advance (e.g. for the next 20 years). This in 
effect gives it full control of the parcel.
(b) Individuals who are in principle not eligible to 
purchase land(for example persons related 
to corporate farms) try to cover purchase of 
land under various non-purchase contracts. For 
example they receive land as gifts, or “inherit” it 
from elderly for lifelong support.
(c) Although land can only be owned by private 
persons, the problem of using land as collateral 
for credit is circumvented by using the “right to 
lease” as collateral.
(d) From the mid 2000s onwards limited liability 
companies began to collect leases of a duration 
of up to 50 years, to establish large agroholdings 
as discussed earlier with contracts up to 50 years. 
Such long leases effectively amount to purchases
 - Upon lifting of the moratorium, existing contracts will 
remain in force until their date of expiration, unless new 
legislation rules differently.
Combined, the share distribution of land and the Land 
Moratorium are a precious institutional arrangement that 
has prevented fragmentation of holdings into small parcels, 
the loss of agricultural land to construction projects around 
cities and, in principle, concentration of ownership of former 
state and collective farms in the hands of oligarchies. 
Lifting the Moratorium could, therefore, have dramatic 
consequences in two directions. One is fragmentation of 
fields into plots that are hardly accessible, with all ensuing 
conflicts within local communities. The other, opposite 
direction is excessive concentration by fair as well as unfair 
means of all property rights by agroholdings and other large 
players on the land market. We return to these aspects in 
Section 8 below.
Marketing
Marketing is a significant bottleneck for small to medium 
farm enterprises. Even maintaining a market share proves 
increasingly difficult due to stiff competition from imported 
products. Therefore, there is a need for better communication 
along the product chain from primary producers to retailers, 
and for cooperation among suppliers to consolidate their 
shipments and to supply better quality crops as required by 
the market. Box 1 shows an example of such of a project 
that was successfully conducted with technical assistance 
from Canada.
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Box 1
The Ukraine Horticulture Development Project (UHDP) is being implemented in two regions of Ukraine (Crimea 
Region and Zaporizhhya Region), within the framework of the international technical assistance by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The project’s objective is to assist small farmers and 
households having farmland to develop their production potential. Project experts assist them in applying new 
technologies and finding new marketing channels to get higher benefits from their small farms. 
The project has developed a consolidation model where small and medium farmers create a producer group with 
a local leader. In one geographical location one group can be created. Afterwards, groups can be united to regional 
clusters, belonging to one geographic area.
The implementation experience of this model in Nyzhnohirskyi District, Crimean AR, showed that households have 
achieved substantial success in improving their commercialization potential after consolidation - about 1400 tons 
of agricultural products were consolidated and sold within the period from early spring until late autumn 2011. 
These are primarily radish, cucumbers, tomatoes, and table grapes. Farmers consolidated in one group started 
to see each other as partners rather than competitors. They understood that individual success of each group 
member depends on the neighbor’s success. Additional proof of positive aspect from consolidation is that in 2011, 
three times more products were consolidated and sold compared to 2010, and the number of group members has 
doubled. 
In 2011, UHDP funded the construction of a local market in Sadove village. Also, two refrigerators were installed 
for storing products, which allow consolidating big lots and storing products while prices are fluctuating. A great 
success has been reached in cooperation of Sadove small producers with large Ukrainian super markets and Russian 
wholesale buyers. Nowadays, supermarkets provide producers with unified plastic boxes for products to be stored 
and then transported. This satisfies supermarkets’ strict requirements for the quality of products. There have been 
days in summer and autumn when up to ten trucks were loaded simultaneously in the Sadove village market. 
Source: http://www.uhdp.org.ua/
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Since consumer demand is rather stable and average per 
capita availability of food is already above 3 200 kcal per 
day,22 there is little room for further growth in demand for 
Ukraine’s main crops. Consequently, the country needs to 
address inevitable variation in output by adjusting its foreign 
trade and public stockholding with sufficient flexibility. This 
has not proved easy, particularly because of the unstable 
course of Ukrainian politics.
Export restrictions
As wheat  products are Ukraine’s main staple and the 
population spends a large fraction of its revenue on food, the 
government is permanently concerned with keeping the price 
of bread in check when shortages arise, activating a host of 
interventions in production and trade in such situations.
 
Hence, in 2006 rising food prices and poor harvests resulted 
in the imposition of export quotas for wheat, barley, maize 
and rye that remained effective until 2008, causing grain 
exports to drop from 12 mln ton in 2005 and 2006 to 4 
mln ton in 2007.23  Combined with the export restrictions of 
Russia and Argentina, this was one of the factors leading to 
the price spike on international markets. Export quotas were 
also implemented in 2010 and 2011.
Though the procedures of quota distribution and the 
certification requirements for export were particularly unclear, 
it was evident that specific trading companies had access 
to the quotas issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and 
Food (such as Khlib Investbud, a trading division of a larger 
state-run enterprise, the State Food and Grain Corporation 
of Ukraine), while most of the domestic grain traders receive 
small shares or no share at all.  These companies also had 
discretionary access to the Agrarian Fund, enabling them 
to start a campaign for domestic purchase of grain on 
the basis of forward contracts. The scheme was supposed 
to alleviate financing needs of farmers, and supplying 
them with fertilizer and fuel at reduced prices. However, 
the particulars of the arrangements remain cloudy, not to 
mention their effectiveness; USDA reports that the quotas 
22  According to data from the Food Balance Sheets of FAOSTAT
23  FAO Food Outlook, various issues.
have cost Ukrainian farmers around one billion US$, due to 
lower prices.24 
In 2011 the grain export restrictions were lifted again and 
replaced by custom duties, of about 10% of export prices. 
As this discouraged exports, the duties were suspended 
in January 2012. For the harvesting years 2011-12 and 
2012-13 cereals exports are estimated to exceed 20 mln 
tons, well above the preceding years.  Although exports are 
now apparently growing at a steady pace, the procurement 
of grains and the subsequent shipping from domestic to 
international markets still operate under a semi-closed, 
informal regime, driven by interest groups. This creates rents 
that undermine the country’s competitiveness.
Overall, it would seem that the export quotas and duties have 
served varying interests but not contributed to the country’s 
welfare. A country with an after all far from dominant share 
in world trade has little to gain from such restrictions, since 
it is too small to lift world prices, and both food consumers 
and the treasury are better served by higher export revenue.
The grain import regime of the EU 
One valid reason for restricting grain exports may be that 
foreign markets impose import quotas that discriminate 
against the country. The export quotas in this case serve 
as voluntary export restraint, essentially to prevent the 
importing country from earning the rent on this quota. This 
is not relevant for a country that has free access to the world 
market but Ukraine has significant limitations in this respect, 
in terms of geography and constraints in trade infrastructure 
but also because it has so far not been able to secure MFN-
status (“most-favored nation”) on many markets. Hence 
it has some ground for considering such voluntary export 
restraints at times. 
For instance, in 2002 Ukraine had built up a considerable 
surplus of wheat after two consecutive years of bumper crops 
and it managed to export 4.6 mln tons of wheat to the EU 
(against 1 mln ton in 2001 and 0.2 mln tons in 2003).25 This 
raised concerns among the feed grain producers in Europe, 
fearing that future inflow of cheap Ukrainian feed grains 
24  OECD (2012) Competitiveness and private sector development: Ukraine 2012. 
25  Source: Eurostat COMEXT
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would depress domestic EU-prices. The EU operated at the 
time a variable levy system and had no specific instruments 
in hand to control such a surge of imports.  
Yet, preparations to adjust the import regime and make it 
compatible with WTO rules were already well underway and 
in 2003 the EU had established a new import regime for 
grains that prevails to date, with import protection through 
tariffs up to a maximum ad valorem level notified at WTO 
(see Table 6). This tariff may be combined with a system of 
tariff rate quotas (TRQ), whereby consignments of imports 
up to the quota level can be imported at a lower, possibly 
zero, tariff rate (see Table 7). These consignments may be 
allocated to specific countries or on a first-come first-serve 
basis.
Table 6 shows that import tariffs raised by the EU are 
currently rather high, about half of the import price. Yet, the 
EU can lower or suspend these bound rates, for example 
when domestic prices are high and stock levels are low. It has 
done so in the past for durum and high quality wheat, and 
for the tariffs of the TRQ of low quality wheat. But typically, 
rates for low quality wheat for shipments in excess of the 
quotas are being maintained, providing import protection for 
European feed grain producers. 
Ukraine can thus profit from low-duty access to the EU, but 
only as far as it can secure a TRQ, and for this it has to 
compete with other exporting countries on a first-come first-
serve base, except for Canada and the US that possess TRQs 
of their own. For most of the years after 2002, Ukraine’s 
exports to the EU have hardly surpassed the mark of 1 mln 
tons, presumably because it could not get hold of more TRQ 
access.  
Clearly, duty free access of all types of Ukrainian grain would 
be very favorable for Ukrainian traders and to farmers who 
have access to this trading channel and receive market 
prices. Hence one of the central questions to be settled in 
the upcoming Free Trade Arrangement between the EU and 
Ukraine is whether the EU will award duty free access, or a 
country specific TRQ to Ukraine. 
 
Table 6.  EU grain import tariffs, €/ton
Bound tariff
Durum wheat 148
Wheat, high quality 95
Wheat, medium/low quality 95
Barley 93
Rye 93
Maize 94
Source: TARIC, the online customs tariff database of the EU’s Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union
Table 7.  EU tariff rate quotas (TRQ) for grains, €/ton
TRQ (tons) Tariff (€/t)
Durum wheat 50 000 148
Quality wheat 30 000 0
Wheat, medium/low quality
- for US
- for Canada
- for other countries 
572 000
38 853
2 371 600
12
12
12
Barley 306 215 16
Malting Barley 50 000 8
Maize 242 074 0
Source: TARIC, the online customs tariff database of the EU’s Directorate-General Taxation and Customs Union 
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In Soviet times the collective and state farms operated 
both as companies and as communal public services. They 
offered assured employment to the rural population in crop 
and livestock production. They were engaged in numerous 
support activities such as transport, construction, repair of 
housing and equipment as well as in agricultural processing 
and other industrial production. They supplied a wide range of 
social services including kindergartens, health care facilities, 
and entertainment, and provided financial and other support 
to the state-run communal facilities.
The abrupt ending of all this at the beginning of the first stage 
of transition (1990-1999), obviously weighed heavily on rural 
areas. Most critical was the loss of guaranteed employment 
that started a wave of labor migration to the cities, worsening 
the demographic situation, and leaded to loss of morale and 
motivation in rural communities. Supply of social services 
dropped dramatically also due to lack of purchasing power.
Since 2000, the dismantling and associated exodus from 
the countryside have slowed down, but little recovery can be 
noticed, and the newly formed corporate farms were released 
from any duty in the social sphere, as a presidential decree “On 
some measures of improvement of non-State agricultural 
enterprises’ economic activity conditions” (2000)26 entrusted 
local government with the task of providing social, cultural, 
entertaining and servicing facilities, formerly residing with 
collective and state farms, while some facilities were 
privatized. 
Lack of financial resources prevented local government from 
properly conducting these tasks and many social facilities 
were closed eventually, whereas privately owned facilities 
26  Available at: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/398/2000. 
adopted a commercial orientation with higher service 
charges that took them out of reach of common rural people. 
Several attempts were made at state level to halt the ongoing 
degradation of living conditions in rural areas. Presidential 
decrees approved “Main actions for development of the 
social sphere in rural regions” (2000) and a short-term 
“State program of rural regions’ social sphere development 
for the period to 2005” (2002). Yet, the implementation of 
these decrees was deficient, as insufficient funds were made 
available.
In practice, much of the declared “support of rural areas” 
amounted to promotion of a commercially profitable mode 
of agricultural production. The “Governmental Program on 
the development of the Ukrainian village for the period up to 
2015” that was approved in 2007 is a case in point.27 Despite 
its name most of the program focuses on raising agricultural 
production and only a small part relates to improving the 
rural population’s access to public goods. The program also 
failed to address the central issue of unemployment and 
lack of economic diversification in rural regions, and it was 
not properly financed, and the 2008 financial crisis caused 
all funding of rural development projects within this program 
to be stopped altogether.
Employment in agriculture
According to the State Statistics Service, Ukraine’s labor 
force counts 22 mln people by 2010, which amounts to 
a participation rate of 48%, which is lower than in Russia 
(53%), Kazakhstan (52%) and Czech Republic (51%). Rural 
labor force has declined following outmigration, ageing, and 
27  Available at: http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1158-2007-п
S o c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s
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Table 8.  Structure of agricultural labor force in 2009, 1000 people.
Indicator Corporate farms
Individual farms
Peasant farms Household plots
Number of people employed in agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, fishing, and fish farming
868.0 102.8 2 181.4
Source: Calculations based on household survey data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
Note: Employed in agriculture are all those persons who could report during the survey period at least one hour per week employment in their own 
household with the aim to produce or sell agricultural products.
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low fertility in rural areas, and by 2010, 3.5 mln workers, 
equivalent to 16% of the labor force were employed in 
agriculture (see Figure 3). Survey information processed 
within the present project confirms this, see Table 8.
Hence about 3.1 mln people are considered employed under 
this broad definition as compared to the agricultural labor 
force of 3.5 mln. This very crude estimate is provided here 
only to indicate that the officially registered unemployment 
(see Figure 12) of less than 5% is presumably too low. 
Moreover, the activities are likely to be quite simple, due to 
lack of better opportunities rather than to lack of skills.
Income composition
Table 9 presents  the composition of rural income based 
on socio-economic household surveys. It appears that since 
2000, farming households (FH) have been able to recuperate 
paid employment, and become less subsistence oriented. 
The value of sales and own consumption of agricultural 
production has dropped from 50% in 2000 to 24 % in 2010, 
also because of increased dependence on social transfers.
In terms of the percentage of population below the national 
poverty line, poverty has dropped significantly since 2000, 
from 85% to 28% in 2010. The World Bank usually bases 
its poverty estimates on $1.25 or $2 a day criteria, which is 
a much lower threshold than the national subsistence level 
($4.4 or € 3.43  per day in 2012). Using these criteria for 
a lower middle-income county such as Ukraine, the poverty 
count is insignificant and less that 0.2% of the population. 
Non-monetary aspects of poverty: housing and social 
services in decline
Several qualitative aspects of poverty are not well accounted 
for by surveys that measure income in cash and in kind. We 
mention a few.
Figure 12.  Registered unemployment rates of the 
economically active population, 2000-2009
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine
Table 9.  Composition of rural income (average per household per month, UAH)
Indicators 2000 2005 2010
Increase 2000-2010 (in %) 
at current 
prices
adjusted for 
consumer 
price index*
Total income 435.8 1 210.8 3 086.8 708.2 246.7
cash income 274.3 993.9 2 607.3 950.4 331.1
   including:
   - salary 85.4 342.2 1 011.9 1 184.6 412.7
   - revenue from output sales 61.5 171.3 343.5 558.3 194.5
   - pensions 60.7 313.9 782.7 1 289.9 449.4
   - social assistance 4.3 30.4 109.2 2 544.5 886.6
income in kind 161.5 216.9 479.5 296.9 103.4
   including:
   - value of own products consumed by FHs 160.0 186.7 406.9 254.3 88.6
% of population with average per capita 
consumption per month less than poverty line**
85.2 54.1   28.6 х х
% expenditures spent on food 71.5 62.1  56.1 х х
Source: Calculations based on HERd (2000, 2005, 2010), the Household Expenditures and Resources data of the SSSU (State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine). 
Notes:  *Consumer price index of 2010 as to 2000: 287. **Since 2007 the poverty line is based on per capita income and it is adjusted regularly for 
inflation; to 701 UAH/month in 2009, to 1044 UAH/month (that is 103 €/month) in July 2012.
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Housing conditions. During the transition, the housing 
conditions in rural areas have deteriorated significantly, 
due to lack of maintenance and obsolescence of buildings 
as well as of water supply systems and sewage networks. 
Roads and transport infrastructure were equally degraded. 
Following the overall trend of dismantling in rural areas, 
construction of new housing sharply dropped in the 1990s, 
to one-third of the 1990-level by 2001. Construction picked 
up after this until the crisis of 2009. Even the highest level 
reached in 2008 was 20% below that of 1990 and 20% less 
per 1000 inhabitants than the level in urban areas. 
Because of the exodus from rural areas, numerous houses 
stay vacant especially in distant villages. Moreover, the rural 
population has limited access to credit for building or buying 
well equipped houses. At the same time, lack of employment 
opportunities and unsatisfactory conditions for independent 
farming provide little incentive to the young and middle aged 
for envisaging a future in these villages.
Most construction in rural areas is currently undertaken by 
commercial developers around big cities and in recreational 
zones. There is one assistance program of house construction 
for rural people through long term preferential credits (at 
3% interest rate) but only 6-7% of the new houses are built 
under this program, because access to it is very limited and 
far from transparent.
Water and sanitation are generally underdeveloped: 22% of 
villages have a water supply system and only 2.6% villages 
have a sewage system. 
On the positive side, the number of villages with access to 
gas increased. This is an example of successful cooperation 
between rural communities, government authorities and the 
private sector. With state funds and sponsors’ assistance, 
inter-village pipelines were built, while villagers paid for 
the network and connections within the settlements. The 
results proved impressive: the number of villages with gas 
connection rose by a factor of 5.5 since 1990, currently 
reaching 47% of villages.28
Access to social, cultural and entertainment services. 
For the reasons mentioned earlier (collective and state 
farms no longer in charge; households lacking  purchasing 
power; no funds allocated by government) the transition 
witnessed a major decline in access to social, cultural and 
entertainment services. The closing of schools was slow 
initially but accelerated after 2000, at a rate of 4% in the 
period 2001-2005 and by 5.6% in 2006-2009, partly in 
response to the drop in numbers of school-age children in 
28  Source: Calculated on the base of dataset “1-Selo” (Survey of rural settlements). 
rural area. A “school bus” program was initiated to alleviate 
the consequences but it remains insufficient and chronically 
underfinanced: in 2010 only 112 school buses were procured 
instead of the planned 496.29
A reform of the healthcare system was also decided, 
with the announced intent of improving service quality by 
modernization of healthcare centers, and improvement of 
the ambulance networks. However, in practice this often 
amounts to accelerated closing of village’s nurse-midwife 
stations and of district hospitals while the proposed 
modernization is actually being postponed.
In response to these deficiencies in the public sector, large 
corporate farms have recently taken up the provision of 
social services, in the footsteps of their predecessors, the 
collective and state farms. While this keeps some areas 
livable that would be deprived of all services otherwise, 
it also is being criticized for revamping old paternalist 
structures in rural communities and for tying communities to 
corporate structures’ interests with all ensuing clientelism in 
the political sphere.
The distribution of poverty 
Table 9 pointed to the important rise in pensions and social 
assistance during the period 2000-2010. These transfers 
were not distributed evenly across the rural population, and 
resulted in rising income inequalities. 
Figure 13 shows that over 50% of young and middle-aged 
families with children30 are classified as “very poor” (income 
below poverty line or subsistence level, see the notes to Table 
9), whereas only 0.1% of retired people belong to the “very 
poor” category. This suggests that current policy measures 
such as financial assistance to families with children are 
ineffective or insufficient.
The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the rural sector in 
Ukraine, performed by IEF-NASU in this project, has identified 
two policy options that appear to be promising in addressing 
some of the social issues in rural areas. The first is an 
increase in the area cultivated by small rural households, 
and the second improved governance of land rental markets.
Policy option 1: Increasing area cultivated by small 
rural households
It would seem that addressing poverty among young and 
middle-aged families with children, should not be too 
difficult since these groups are still of working age and can 
29  Source: Calculated on the base of dataset «1-Selo» (Survey of rural settlements).
30  Pensioners – all members are retired; young – household head is younger than 35 
years old, without children and retired members;  young with children; middle-aged – 
household head is between 36 and 60 years old, without children and retired members; 
middle-aged with children; mix-aged households – all others are not included in the 
above mentioned groups.
S o c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s
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contribute to the rural economy. A natural option would be to 
increase the size of their land holdings. 31
A statistical analysis was conducted to estimate the probable 
impact of such an intervention (for a brief description of the 
methodology, see Annex 1). It appears that the impact on 
revenue from sales would be significant. 
As shown in Table 10, an improvement in annual sales 
revenue (SR) of 1 232 UAH per household would result from 
an increase in cultivated land from 0-0.25 ha to 0.26-0.55 
ha per household. Larger increases (up to 0.56-1.99 hа, and 
over 2 hа) would result in an increase of sales revenues by 2 
930 UAH and 9 795 UAH, respectively, where we recall that 
a poverty line of UAH 701/month per capita was applied in 
early 2009. 
31  The HERd survey of 2009 has a sample size of 10 459 households, including 3 
382 rural.
Crossing poverty status and land size (Table 11) demonstrates 
that the share of households without land or with less than 
0.25 ha is relatively large among the young farm households 
with children, compared to average. These groups would, 
therefore, seem natural targets for land redistribution 
programs.
While the relatively small land size for young families with 
children can be explained to a certain extent by their low 
willingness to engage in farming activities, there also is a 
maximum level of 2 ha that farm households can cultivate, 
as set in 2003 under a law “About private rural households”. 
Most importantly, the land they would receive has to be 
released either from state land reserves that are modest, 
and unevenly spread, or from corporate farms and from 
other households. Both would need appropriate incentives 
for this.
Таble 10. Sales revenue increase depending on increasing area of land in use*, UAH per farm household per year
Household social categories
Land in use
0.26-0.55 hа 0,56-1.99 hа 2 hа and more
Pensioners 715 2 063   5 565
Young 1 445 -   -
Young with children 2 628 5 190   3 985
Middle-aged 1 217 3 667 12 685
Middle-aged with children 1 774 4 290 15 674
Mix-aged 1 660 3 014   5 420
Rural Ukraine 1 232 2 930   9 795
 Source: Calculations based on HERd (2009), SSSU
* compared to households with land area less than 0.25 hа (non-treatment class)
Figure 13.  Social description of poverty in rural Ukraine
Source: authors calculations by GRCP, based on HERd (2009) of SSSU.31
JRC80164 IPTS Farming and rural development in Ukraine making dualisation work.indd   40 07/05/13   17:36
41
Policy option 2: Improved governance of land rental 
markets
Agricultural land leasing in Ukraine: basics
As discussed in Section 5 above, under the Moratorium 
on Land, all transactions in land formerly owned by state 
and collective farms take the form of lease, and no land in 
agricultural use shall be converted to any other use, specified 
categories of public use excepted. At present, most of the 
land is cultivated by farm households, and by corporate 
and peasant farms that lease land from others for their 
operations. In 2000, 22.4 million ha was leased or almost 
83% of cultivated land in Ukraine.32
The zoning restriction prohibiting non-agricultural use limits 
the market value. Another important limitation is that there 
is no effective price disclosure regarding the rent paid. 
The rent paid is agreed upon individually between lessor 
and lessee. Usually, the minimal lease payment is calculated 
as percentage of the nominal land valuation (NLV), as 
“recommended” by presidential decrees, currently a minimum 
of 3% of NLV.33
From the Household dataset 2009 it can be inferred that the 
majority of the households who lease out their land receive 
no more than 400 UAH per hectare (30% in the 1-200 
bracket and 36% in the 200-400 bracket) (see Figure 14A). 
Remarkably, as much as 22% of households receive nothing 
at all, since lessors often delay payments or do not pay at all.
32  See  APHD (Agricultural Policy for Human Development Project), “Agricultural 
Policy in Ukraine in 2001: Review and Outlook. V. Artiushin, I. Chapko et al., Policy 
Analysis Unit, Government of Ukraine.
33  NLV levels are used for leasing rates for state and municipal agriculture lands, 
and define the minimal lease rates for private-owned land shares and for some other 
purposes. The 2011 levels were 11 949 UAH for arable land, 44 566 UAH for perennial 
crops, 5 893 UAH for hayfields,  3 581 UAH for pastures.
From the same dataset it also appears that 31% receive 
no more than 2 000 UAH in income and 29% between 2 
000 and 3 000 UAH as income supplement (see Figure 14B), 
implying that most households presumably lease out less 
than 10 ha. Indeed, the income shares from land rent prove 
to be modest: lease payments make up for less than 5% 
of total income for about 62% households and for only 5% 
lease payments are more than 15% in their total income. 
S o c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s
Таble 11. Farm household distribution according to the land in use area, %
Household social 
categories
Categories 
according to 
the income 
level
Land in use
no land ≤ 0.25 hа 0.26-0.55 hа 0.56-1.99 hа 2 hа≤
Young families with 
children
very poor 4.7 35.5 36.5 18.7 4.6
poor 4.9 21.0 39.5 25.9 8.6
middle - 40.0 36.0 20.0 4.0
Middle-aged 
families with 
children
very poor 1.2 29.3 34.7 31.3 3.5
poor 1.0 24.9 32.5 32.0 9.6
middle 2.0 22.8 28.0 29.7 17.5
Rural Ukraine 2.0 27.0 33.0 33.0 5.0
Source: calculations using GRCP package based on data of HERd (2009), SSSU
Figure 14A.  Distribution of households, which leased 
out their land, in rent per ha received in 2009
Source: HERd (2009), SSSU, using GRCP computations
Figure 14B.  Distribution of households, which 
leased their land out, by rent received in 2009, %
Source: HERd (2009), SSSU, using GRCP computations
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Current regulations suffer from the major limitation that 
the minimal lease rate of 3% NLV has the status of 
recommendation only. Furthermore, the NLV needs to be set 
in accordance with market value. Finally, even agreed rates 
are often not paid, without consequences for the lessee.  
Originally, there was a general sense that the rent was 
too low, but that a rise would occur soon, partly because a 
moratorium was imposed on land sales, now scheduled to 
be lifted by the end of 2012 (but the date was postponed 
earlier). This prevented active selling of land shares after 
introduction of the land rent market.  
For a differentiated picture of the land lease market in 
Ukraine, a spatially explicit analysis has been conducted, 
which shows the geographical distribution (at regional level) 
of major indicators.
Increase the Normative Land Valuation (NLV) 
The Government of Ukraine recently made attempts to 
increase NLV, multiplying them by a factor 1.76 as of 2012.34 
Recently, a new methodology was developed by the State 
Agency for Land Resources. Figure 15 shows the implications, 
assuming that all rents are paid at 3% of new NLV levels.
34 Source: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1185-2011-п>.
Such a change would obviously put a burden on lessees. 
According to the statistics many corporate farms except those 
engaged in production of wheat, sunflower, corn, rapeseed 
for exports would not be able to pay the consequent sums. 
However, it is common knowledge that corporate farms have 
a tendency to underreport their earnings so as to minimize 
taxation and receive subsidies from government. 
Lessors abide by established minimum rental rate
Out of the 4.6 million land lease agreements signed in 2011, 
almost 39% of stated lease rates are below 3% of the NLV, 
including 5% of the agreements with a lease payment of 
1.5% of the normative land valuation. Figure 16 shows the 
spatial differentiation of lease agreements by lease rates 
below 3% of NLV.
Figure 17 shows the increase in lease payments in the 
different regions of Ukraine if the lessees were actually 
paying the minimal lease rate of 3% of NLV. This suggests 
that the land rental market functions poorly, and explains 
that land rents are low. A remedy to this would mobilize 
significant revenues for vulnerable households in rural areas. 
It would also free public resources currently spent on income 
transfers for more productive purposes. Since government 
Figure 15.  Average rent payments per land share in 2012
Data: Regional (Oblast) aggregates, provided by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and State Agency of Land Resources.
Lease payments are spatially 
differentiated from minimal level – 620 
UAH in Ivano-Frankivsk region to maximal 
level – 4600 UAH in Kherson region.
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itself is an important holder of land certificates, this would 
also directly contribute to the public revenue.
Health issues
A discussion of social conditions in rural areas of Ukraine 
cannot escape from mentioning HIV/AIDS. According to 
Unicef Statistics, Ukraine numbered 350 000 HIV-positive 
persons in 2009, which amounts to 1.1% percent of the 
adult population. 
The illness was first identified in 1987, and could spread 
fast in the years thereafter, in particular after the breakup 
of the Soviet Union. The explosive growth was facilitated 
by the wide availability of drugs in Ukraine, since Ukraine 
has become a transit country for opium transport from the 
Middle East to Europe. Ukraine is even known to grow opium 
of its own. It has a strong chemical industry, and oversight 
over the pharmaceutical industry in terms of selling drugs 
without prescription is inadequate.
Initially the disease was mainly transmitted via infected 
syringes, but now also via sexual contacts, violence in 
prisons, and infection at birth. In fact, half of the HIV-infected 
persons are now women at child-bearing age. 
In 2001, the government launched a national plan for 
combating HIV/AIDS, mainly for treatment of patients. 
However, it is still hard to reach marginalized groups. 
Prevention activities are largely funded by international 
organizations. These seem to pay off, as most recent data 
suggest that even though prevalence remains high, the 
number of patients no longer is on the rise.35
35  For the most recent updates, see the Millennium Development Goals, at http://
mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg.
S o c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s
Figure 16. Share of rental rates below 3% of NLV (2011)
Data: Regional (Oblast) aggregates for NLV, provided by the State Agency of Land Resources.
The highest share of lease agreements with rates below 3% observed in 
Crimea, Kherson and Mykolaiv regions with high NLV. But other region with the 
same high NLV levels show significantly lower share of agreements with rates 
below 3% of NLV (Cherkasy, Poltava, Khmelnyckyi and others).
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Figure 17. Increase in lease payments per hectare in 2010, when the minimum rate of 3% of NLV is paid
Data: Agricultural Enterprises Survey (SSSU) and Regional (Oblast) aggregates for NLV, provided by the State Agency of Land Resources .
Average difference between 3% of NLV and 
rent paid by farms in 2010, UAH per 1 hectare 
of arable land:
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After the Chernobyl accident, large areas of Ukraine, Belarus 
and Russia were contaminated by radiation, resulting in the 
evacuation and resettlement of over 300 thousand people. 
Due to unsafe levels of radiation, about 180 000 ha of 
arable land were removed from agricultural use. 36
36  Mishchenko, N. and K. Gumeniuk (2006) Agro-ecological assessment for the 
transition of the agricultural sector in Ukraine, IIASA Report IR-06-052, IIASA, Austria.
Soil erosion
Soil degradation linked to the exploitation of land resources 
is a widespread problem influencing land productivity in 
Ukraine (Figure 18). According to the National Report on 
Environment, soil erosion affected 57% of the arable land, 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e
8.  Environmental issues in 
agriculture
Figure 18. Extent of Soil erosion in Ukraine
Source: Atlas of Ukraine, 2000, Institute for Geography NASU / Intelligence Systems GEO.
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of which some 32% by wind erosion, 22% by water erosion, 
and 3% by a combination of both. The loss of organic matter 
in soils, due to the excessive removal of crop residues from 
the fields, is in the range of 0.6-1.0 ton per ha annually.37 
Compaction of the topsoil is a major cause of soil degradation, 
resulting from inappropriate tilling practices. Compacted 
soils suffer from deteriorated soil structure as well as from 
reduced water holding capacity, which lowers infiltration 
capacity and increases run-off and loss of mineral fertilizers. 
Furthermore, inadequate replenishment of plant nutrients, 
particularly the mining of P and K (cf. Table 4 above) under 
uninterrupted cultivation has impoverished the soils.
Lack of crop rotation is another explanatory factor. Repeated 
alternation between wheat and sunflowers causes quick 
mineralization of organic elements and restrains humification. 
This soil depletion is only to a limited extent compensated by 
fertilizer and manure from livestock, in some scattered areas 
37  Medvedev, V. and M. Lisovyj, eds.(2001) State of soils fertility in Ukraine and 
forecast of its changes under conditions of present-day farming. Shtrih Press, Kharkiv, 
Ukraine.
in the western and central parts of the country, see Figure 
19, in particular the dark green areas.
Activities on land conservation have speeded up lately, 
especially in soil chalking, plastering and building soil-saving 
constructions. At the same time efforts towards protection 
of banks have increased, which illustrates the importance 
to deal with flooding and water logging in Ukraine, but other 
soil conservations measures are still below the level of the 
1990s (Table 12).
Forests can provide shelter against soil erosion and dust 
storms and their role in a flat country like Ukraine is critical. 
Up to 100 forest shelterbelts were created recently, but it 
does not meet actual needs. Most of the shelterbelts are in 
poor condition, since they are thinned due to ageing, storms, 
deforestation and fires. 
Figure 19.  Nutrient balance (in kg humus per ha)
Source: County-level data provided by the State Center on Soil Fertility Protection.
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Salinization
Irrigation may lead to water-logging and evaporation 
directly from the water surfaces. Consequently, a residue of 
relatively mineralized water is left in the soil, which may drain 
to the surface water system or may reach an aquifer and 
contribute to increased salinity of groundwater. In addition to 
this process, pollutants may enter the groundwater system. 
Typical examples are road salt (applied in winter), fertilizers, 
domestic, industrial and agricultural effluents. The coastal 
areas of Ukraine, which are mostly dry and where irrigation 
takes place, suffer from such salinization. 
The International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre 
(IGRAC)38 made in 2009 a world-wide inventory of saline 
groundwater occurrence, and identified extensive bodies of 
brackish and saline groundwater along the Northern shores of 
the Black Sea. Rehabilitation of irrigation systems or returning 
lands to nature or perennials, and forestry are strategies to 
counter these processes. For example, in a USAID-funded 
project on sustainable development of Ukraine in 2001, the 
suggestion has been made to re-naturalize about 20% or 10 
million ha of arable land, partly for afforestation and partly 
for use as grassland and pasture.39
38  Van Weert, F, J. van der Gun and J. Reckman (2009) Global Overview of Saline 
Groundwater Occurrence and Genesis, Int.  Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre, 
http://www.un-igrac.org/dynamics/modules/SFIL0100/view.php?fil_Id=135
39  Bogovin, A.V. (2006) “Country Pasture/Forage Resource Profiles: Ukraine.” FAO, 
Rome.
Biodiversity
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
has listed Ukraine among the countries with high biological 
diversity level, and classified 11 of the nation’s 15 nature 
reserves as Category 1a reserves, the highest category of 
protection. Ukrainian lands in the Carpathians and Danube 
delta are recognized as “hot spots” for conserving biological 
diversity. There are also other protected landscapes, such 
as national parks and biosphere reserves. Ukraine harbours 
flyways for migratory birds, the last virgin steppes in Europe, 
and shares with Romania the second largest wetlands of 
Europe. Ukraine itself adopted legislation for the preservation 
and maintenance of its protected areas, under supervision by 
the newly created Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. 
Nonetheless, both national and international sources provide 
evidence of a decline in biodiversity over past decades.40 
40  See http://www.ulrmc.org.ua/services/binu/prmaterials/Biodiversity_Agriculture.pdf 
by the Ukrainian Land and Resource Management Research Centre (ULMRC) and USAID 
(2007) ‘Ukraine. Biodiversity analysis’, US Agency for International Development, 
Washington DC, prepared by DevTech Systems. 
M o u n t a i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  f o o d  s u p p l y  c h a i n s :
a  d e s c r i p t i v e  p i c t u r e
Table 12.  Land conservation activities in Ukraine, 1990–2010
Characteristic 1990 2000 2005 2010
Application of chalking, 1000 ha 1 407.9 23.9 41.7 73.2
Chalky flour and other chalky materials applied, 1000 
tons
6 930.7 169.7 243.1 340.8
Application of gypsum, 1000 ha 285.4 5.1 2.7 4.4
Gypsum and other gypsum-containing materials, 1000 
tons
1 275.9 27.0 12.1 23.4
Building soil-saving constructions:
swells, drains, km
135.2 9.3 3.6 4.1
terrace embankments,  km 5.4 10.9 6.6 0.0
outfall regulators, units 51 18 2 12
bank stabilization,  km 1.0 4.7 3.9 4.3
Grassland renovation of degraded and polluted arable 
land, ha
12 785 14 974 6 342 1 015
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine
JRC80164 IPTS Farming and rural development in Ukraine making dualisation work.indd   47 07/05/13   17:36
F a r m i n g  a n d  r u r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  U k r a i n e :  m a k i n g  d u a l i s a t i o n  w o r k
48
Pesticides and their leakage into groundwater 41
Besides erosion and salinization, which are essentially due to 
the agro-ecological circumstances, Ukraine’s agriculture also 
has a particular environmental vulnerability that is a legacy 
from its past. In the heydays of central planning, Ukraine 
used to produce and apply high quantities of pesticides and 
chemical fertilizers. Intensity of pesticide use culminated 
in 1986-1987 when vast quantities of highly toxic and 
persistent organochlorines, were spread on the lands to a 
level of up to 3-4 kg/ha. In those days, lack of protective 
clothing and labels, and absence of safety information or 
training, were common practices. 
Since the late 1990s, pesticide production and use have 
dropped significantly. Since pesticides have improved and 
are now active at considerably lower concentrations, and 
since many farmers cannot afford purchase of pesticides 
at previous levels, application intensity has now come into 
the range of 0.7-1 kg/ha. Toxic residues have generally 
decreased in soil and food, with a reduction in the frequency 
of detection of organochlorines in soil of 71% and in crops of 
83% since the peak period of chemical application.
However, these old and obsolete pesticides have not 
disappeared by this and their persistent stockpiles, estimated 
to exceed 13 520 tons, constitute one of the major 
environmental problems in the country.  Most accumulated 
in the 1970s outdoors, in temporary storage, or in containers 
that are by now broken and silently leaking into ground water, 
generally without any monitoring or surveillance. 
This pesticide problem has been noticed quite soon after the 
break up of the Soviet Union, as it became manifest in most 
of the former Soviet republics, and was topic of discussion at 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
which resulted in various initiatives to clean up these stocks. 
Most recently, in 2012, the FAO and the EU have launched, 
under the EU’s Neighborhood Policy, a partnership to assist 
countries in reducing the risks of contamination from 
pesticide stocks.
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)
Of course, the debate about GMO is still open. Most GMO-
crops in the US that have a (possibly specific) resistance 
built in against predators such as insects appear to use less 
pesticides, while there is also a modest increase of yields 
(not more than 5%).42 In developing countries, in particular in 
those where chemicals are not widely used, the yield effect 
41  This section is based on Stefanovska T., and V. Pidlisnyuk (2002) Ukrainian struggle 
with pesticides. Women bear the brunt, Pesticides News, 2002: 57.
42  National Research Council (2010)  Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on 
Farm Sustainability in the United States. Committee on the Impact of Biotechnology on 
Farm-Level Economics and Sustainability. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies 
Press.
appears to be larger (up to 30%).43 Another advantage may 
be to add a second crop in a multiple cropping system, such 
as done in Argentina with soybeans. 
Some GMOs have been developed to increase tolerance 
against weeds. This is mainly intended as a labor and 
herbicide cost saving measure, since it makes it possible 
to apply an all-purpose herbicide at significance dosages 
without hurting the GMO-crop. As was extensively pointed 
by GMO-opponents, the downside of this is obviously that 
it promotes indiscriminate use of herbicides, which could be 
particularly damaging to Ukraine’s biodiversity in rural areas 
that are already plagued as it is by excessive pesticide use 
and leakage. 
Whatever the objective merits and drawbacks of GMOs, 
Ukraine is a major agricultural exporter and has to account 
for concerns among its customers, the EU in particular, and to 
supply them with GMO-free products if they ask for it. To meet 
WTO regulations, Ukraine aspires to establish a regulatory 
and monitoring framework for approval and testing of 
GMO products. In the absence of such a framework, current 
practice appears to be that half of soybean production is 
Round-up ready, while other crops such as corn and sugar 
beet are partly GMO-based. Overall about 5% of production 
is, according to USDA not free from GMO.44
To control this process, government has issued legislative 
proposals that envisage mandatory GMO labeling for 
food products and started with the creation of certified 
laboratories for GMO-testing. This should ease exports to 
GMO free zones such as the EU, but at a cost, since it calls for 
splitting marketing channels into GMO- and GMO-free crops, 
with adequate testing protocols. Segregation would actually 
not be too difficult at present, because trade is currently 
in the hands of large conglomerates that would have the 
means and power to effectuate the necessary measures via 
their own channels say, to the EU (for GMO free crops) and 
the Middle East (for the remainder). 
Nutrient recycling
Ukraine will need significant volumes of plant nutrients to 
improve its crop yields. Nitrogen supply is solely limited 
by availability of energy. Whether Ukraine should import it 
or produce it by itself on the basis of its own resources is 
purely a matter of comparative advantage. For the other two 
macro-nutrients phosphorus P, and potash K, the situation is 
quite different though. 45 Both are essential for all life and 
have no conceivable substitutes. Phosphorus is only mined in 
43  National Research Council (2010)  op. cit.
44  See Ukraine: Agricultural Biotechnology Annual (2011, 2012) GAIN report, Foreign 
Agricultural Service, USDA, Washington DC.
45  Malingreau, J.P., H. Eva and A. Maggio (2012) NPK: will there be enough plant 
nutrients to feed a world of 9 billion in 2050? JRC Science and Policy Report 25327. 
Brussels, Joint Research Centre.
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a major way in a few countries (primarily Morocco, China and 
US), and deposits are limited. For potash supply is abundant 
but the cost of development of new mines is particularly 
high. Both P and K originate from mineral deposits of mixed 
composition that are contaminated by toxic metals, uranium 
and cadmium in particular. Spreading vast quantities on 
Ukraine’s land creates additional contamination, unless it is 
avoided by purification of fertilizers or by recycling of organic 
matter, which also prevents irrecoverable loss of P as it drips 
into rivers, and eventually to flush into the sea. These are 
important priorities for a country that seeks to realize its 
potential in a sustainable way. 
The problem is particularly relevant for Ukraine because of 
its nutrient imbalances across the territory (Figure 19 above), 
which mean that nutrients in animal feed are hardly returned 
to the land of origin, and because of the size of exports which 
currently attain 40% of production. If grain exports rise by 60 
mln tons, as would be possible in the case mentioned earlier 
that grain yields rise to 7 tons/ha, the ratio increases to 70%. 
This loss of nutrients has to be compensated eventually, by 
imports of chemical fertilizer, which will become increasingly 
expensive, or of organic manure, and by domestic (organic) 
nutrient recycling. The organic pathway offers the advantage 
of avoiding recurrent infusion of contaminants.
Ukraine is not the only country facing this challenge. All 
major grains exporters see the ratio rising fast. Further 
concentration of agricultural production at high yielding 
locations will only accelerate this trend.
M o u n t a i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  f o o d  s u p p l y  c h a i n s :
a  d e s c r i p t i v e  p i c t u r e
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Overall, we conclude that rural development currently faces 
a major policy challenge that stems from a basic dilemma. 
On the one hand the corporate farms, successors of the state 
and collective farms of the Soviet era enjoy the advantage 
of their large scale, particularly with respect to mechanized 
operations and to purchase of inputs and marketing of 
outputs in large quantities. Such large companies are best 
suited to supply exports, with their peers in the plains of 
Canada and the US as guiding examples.
On the other hand, the countryside is also inhabited by 
rural populations that need income and employment the 
large farms cannot provide them with. Moreover, high value 
agricultural products in livestock and horticulture need 
practices quite different from those traditionally applied on 
such farms, some of which are best conducted on family 
farms of limited size.
Indeed, all over the world, traditional family farms currently 
feel the pressure of global markets and technological 
advances forcefully pushing them towards large scale 
production. Social and environmental considerations in the 
policy sphere and society at large can only to a limited extent 
counter these trends. In many regions, fragmentation of 
parcels into ever tinier plots as a result of inheritance, seizure 
of collaterals by creditors, and development of housing and 
infrastructure can be observed. Land consolidation programs 
are being enacted to end this. 
Similarly, many family farms in the EU currently suffer 
from an excessive debt burden, with high interest payments 
and mortgaged land. They find it very hard making venture 
capitalists invest in their enterprise. 
At the same time Ukraine’s corporate farm holdings have 
access to international capital markets offering large sums 
of risk bearing capital, while over the past twenty years 
social and political pressures have driven agriculture in 
the opposite direction of redistributing the land to small 
farmers, without giving them sufficient means to cultivate it. 
Is family farming or corporate farming the way to go? This 
is a political dilemma that needs to be addressed, primarily 
by recognizing that dualisation is a reality that cannot and 
should not be reversed. The evidence presented in this 
report suggests that Ukraine has ample room for both. Its 
well educated population and rich resource base enable it to 
solve current problems as and where they emerge, without 
prioritizing exports over domestic needs or vice versa.
Dualized farming
More specifically, the historical account in Section 3 has 
indicated that in the early years of independence distribution 
of land of the previous state and collective farms turned 
rural households into passive shareholders: they received 
a share of land (and in some cases equipment) without 
knowing which parcel this share referred to, much like a 
shareholder in a company does not know and does not have 
to know which part of the buildings or equipment the share 
refers to. Yet, rural households do not have access to any 
mechanism for price disclosure of the rent on their shares, 
or any serious competition among its users, much unlike the 
traditional shareholder for equity that is traded on the stock 
exchange. In later years, these shares became truly linked to 
land, through a costly cadastral registration that currently 
covers almost all leased land. However, since the fields are 
very large with very few public tracks or roads crossing, 
there is no way in which an individual farmer can effectuate 
his/her right to independent cultivation, particularly since the 
rights of passage have not been established in any formal 
sense within them.
Casting all these features as shortcomings would be a serious 
mistake. As emphasized earlier, the Land Moratorium and the 
land distribution it maintained are a precious institutional 
arrangement that should not be reformed without adequate 
legislation to replace it, let alone be lifted overnight.
In areas of Ukraine where large scale cultivation of grains 
and oilseeds is efficient such a further partitioning with right 
of passage would seem inappropriate. Farms with multiple 
owners do not need their shareholders to know which parcel 
of land their property right refers to. Hence there is no need 
for cadasters and other registration of individual parcels, 
since they amount to making a spatially explicit property 
M a i n  p o l i c y  c h a l l e n g e :  m a k e  d u a l i z e d  a g r i c u l t u r e  w o r k
9.  Main policy challenge: make 
dualized agriculture work
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title that does not need this.  Consequently, investments into 
such registration will turn out to be a waste of effort and 
also of foreign exchange, to the extent they involve external 
assistance.46
Corporate farms have to be modernized, and their mode of 
operation made to comply with social and environmental 
standards. Implementation of corporate taxes will be an 
intrinsic part of this modernization process as well. The 
proceeds can be used to finance various land development 
and rehabilitation programmes. All this might discourage 
some venture capitalists but demand prospects on world 
agricultural markets seem to be sufficient to guarantee that 
others will take their place, particularly if Ukraine succeeds 
in enhancing its access to EU markets. 
Regarding individual farms, we have seen that household 
plots play a central role in domestic food supply and national 
food security. They also provide essential social safety nets 
to their owners and their relatives. In their absence the 
transition of the past twenty years would have been far more 
painful than it already was. With continued aging of the rural 
population and migration to cities, many of these plots will be 
vacated soon. If family farms succeed in acquiring them this 
will contribute to making the countryside more vibrant and 
attractive for the workers of the corporate farms and their 
families, and enable local government to supply better social 
amenities in the countryside. Yet, some vacated arable 
parcels will remain idle. This land should be prevented 
from degrading into wasteland, without environmental 
protection. Programs will have to be devised to turn them 
into forests and extensive pastures, and in some cases into 
urban developments.
We have also seen that young and middle-aged families 
with children formed the most vulnerable group in rural 
areas. They could benefit from effective property of land, and 
access to credit in a way that offers them sufficient autonomy 
to become independent farmers. Those with ambition and 
skills in farming could acquire parcels from corporate farms 
as well as from household plots of the elderly and from 
other families with more penchant to processing, transport, 
trade and services, particularly in the areas less suited for 
livestock and horticulture. These new family farms would 
need institutional support to achieve land consolidation, and 
to secure access to roads and to waterpoints.
Dualized marketing
Marketing has become dualized as well. Whereas corporate 
farms largely produce for exports of feed grains and biofuel 
feedstocks, individual farms are primarily oriented to the 
domestic market. 
46  See the Rural Land Tilting and Cadastre Development Project, of which progress 
reports are available at http://documents.worldbank.org. 
Despite this divergence in orientation and the present 
segmentation, both farming groups have similar yields for 
cereals of about 3 tons per hectare. Therefore, there is a 
substantial potential for increase. Every additional ton per 
hectare raises exports by 15 mln tons of grains (assuming 
no change in cultivated area and domestic demand)  With 
an optimum yield at about 7 ton/ha, this amounts to 60 mln 
tons, a significant quantity that realistically can be attained 
over an horizon of 15-20 years. For a world population 
expected to increase by one billion during that period and to 
require an additional 300 mln tons, Ukraine could by itself 
contribute 20%!
Until then Ukraine’s trading system will have to overcome 
two major impediments – monopolized trade and inadequate 
grading.
With respect to monopolized trade, the discretionary power 
of trading agencies, and the opacity of their relations to 
individual agricultural holdings prevent development of a 
competitive sector with sufficient capacity to cushion the 
variability of exportable surplus and to reward all farms 
equitably. Since Ukraine is too small to affect world market in 
its favor, it has nothing to gain from export licensing on any 
grounds other than product quality. Reforming the marketing 
chain in this direction would seem to be prerequisite for 
balanced rural development in the near future.
 
With respect to product quality, Ukraine currently mainly 
exports grains of medium and low quality to the EU, for 
which import protection is the highest. Higher quality would 
fetch better prices, and meet lower import tariffs. To comply 
with the standards, Ukraine will have to implement more 
refined grading with reliable certification along the full 
product chain, from the field to the country border. This 
supply of certified grades will have to cover physical aspects 
of product quality (good variety in good condition), product 
safety (free from bacteria and chemical residues), as well 
as social aspects (acceptable working conditions, proof of 
adequate payment of rent to land owners), environmental 
aspects (good agricultural practice; no pollution of air, water 
and soil above given standards; respect of biodiversity; 
animal welfare). Specifically on the agricultural practice, 
various shortcomings such as deficient and unbalanced 
fertilizer applications, inadequate use of pesticides, short 
or absent fallow periods need to be addressed  by better 
extension services, monitoring and law enforcement. 
The benefits of reliable grading and certification reach far 
beyond exports as such. Experience in most of the BRICS 
indicates that premium quality exports can serve as engine 
for development of the domestic market through the 
experience gained as well as confidence and appreciation of 
home consumers for brands that meet export requirements. 
Also internationally certified labeling on exports, with 
adequate inspections, can accomplish a lot in support of 
local governance. The requirements may pertain to social 
and environmental standards, but also extend to payment 
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of adequate contributions to tax revenues, as proof of good 
citizenship.
However, Ukraine’s contribution to world food markets would 
obviously be seriously diminished if a significant fraction of its 
output were to end up as biofuel in cars. Currently, Ukraine’s 
own production of bioethanol remains quite modest. The 
country produces 500 mln liter of bioethanol, the equivalent 
of about 1% of Brazil or US output and 7% of the EU-27. This 
bioethanol essentially originates from sugar beet production 
that exceeds domestic sugar demand by a factor three. 
Biodiesel production is negligible. Far more important are 
the rising exports of oilseeds to the EU for processing into 
biodiesel. There are intentions to set up domestic biodiesel 
production, but the available infrastructure and distribution 
network still lag far behind the stated ambitions.
Such a biofuel program would further reduce net food supply 
and do this by channeling oilseeds or grains away from 
food markets, hence contributing to global food scarcity. 
Furthermore, this demand for biofuel feedstocks, given the 
mandates, would be price-inelastic and hence add to price 
volatility of world markets. 
Nonetheless, we may recall that a biofuel chain, be it 
domestically based or partly located in importing countries, 
could also serve to cushion price fluctuations, if blending 
mandates are kept flexible, and to be reduced temporarily 
under conditions of food scarcity (for example, as mentioned 
in Section 3, there  are calls in the US to reduce the mandates, 
as response to the current drought in the Mid-West). Yet, 
making the mandates flexible cannot legitimate the blending 
mandates themselves, which remain a cartel-like policy 
measure that by pushing up world prices favors net sellers 
of agricultural product while burdening  poor net buyers. 
Capacity building: towards an independent information 
platform
We end with some remarks on the project itself. The project 
has served a double purpose. One has been to report on 
prospects as indicated in its title. The other has been to 
establish cooperation with Ukrainian researchers in the 
domain of agricultural economics, so as to benefit from 
reliable as well as detailed information.
The introduction identified extensive use of primary survey 
data as one of this project’s distinctive features. Availing of 
reliable and coherent information on the trade, social and 
environmental conditions is critical for policy makers within 
the government but also for those conducting a dialogue 
with civil society and with foreign partners. Access to 
primary surveys is critical because of the information they 
can disclose but also because these surveys tend to be too 
large and available at too many locations to be manipulated 
in any particular direction by anyone.
The present project could only make a modest contribution 
to capacity building in this regard. A concrete way to pursue 
the objective of further improving the capacity building 
may consist in promoting development of an independent 
information platform on agriculture and rural development. 
The platform would operate an independent and recognizable 
unit that can on a regular basis provide an update on main 
developments affecting the country, initially focusing on 
agriculture and food security. It would offer a window for 
answering specified queries as formulated by a selected 
group of organizations from government, civil society and 
abroad. The platform would also conduct analysis on the 
basis of the data available to it, and relate its findings to 
those obtained from other sources, such as national account 
statistics, and market information. Its specialized function 
would be to process available surveys, maps, and census 
data on Ukraine, according to transparent protocols, and to 
document the sampling frames for each of them, so as to 
build trust and credibility for the resulting statistics and for 
the studies derived from these. IPTS may contribute to the 
achievement of this objective via facilitating the federation 
of relevant institutions and researchers, and in co-defining 
and co-implementing consistent lines of research.
M a i n  p o l i c y  c h a l l e n g e :  m a k e  d u a l i z e d  a g r i c u l t u r e  w o r k
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The “Polling” component of the GRCP software package 
(Gridding, Regression, Classification and Polling), developed 
at the Center for World Food studies (SOW-VU),47 is a 
multifunctional tool, which employs numerical procedures for 
conditional frequency estimation and maximum likelihood 
prediction on large scale maps and surveys (comprising 
mostly qualitative data). It allows for an integrated processing 
of maps and surveys, combining “people and pixels”. For 
example, it is possible to link several survey data sets for 
analysis, through joint georeferencing of the data. The user 
can also easily link information available from geographical 
maps to a survey or a census dataset, or project survey and 
census information on a map.
In a nutshell, Polling is a non-parametric, GIS-based, 
analytical tool, which can be used for very diverse purposes, 
for example:
• non-parametric estimation of conditional probabilities (like 
in regression),
• non-parametric estimation of treatment effects by 
matching,
• variable selection for further specification of parametric 
and semiparametric regression and classification models, 
• projection of survey data on maps and vice versa,
• interpolation at household or grid level.
Through combining different datasets and maps (even with 
different resolution), polling allows for a comprehensive 
descriptive or analytical processing of social, spatial or 
intertemporal data. It is worth to note that polling is a part 
of the GRCP package, which means that it can easily be 
connected to other components of the package, such as 
Gridding, Classification or Regression. Thus, for example, 
the user can also use polling and gridding as a stand-alone, 
independent GIS.
47 See Keyzer, M.A. (2005) ‘Rule-based and support vector (SV-)regression/
classification algorithms for joint processing of census, map, survey and district data’. 
SOW-VU Working Paper WP 05-01, for the basic principles and launching of GRCP and 
Keyzer, M.A. and S. Pande (2010) ‘Classification by crossing and polling for integrated 
processing of maps and surveys; An addendum to GRCP-software’ SOW-VU Working 
Paper WP 10-01, for the subsequent additions. These papers and applications can be 
found at the website of SOW-VU, see www.sow.vu.nl3
The core operations in polling are (1) the calculation of 
conditional frequencies, and (2) matching and calculation 
of treatment effects. Both tools are operating on a dual 
structure, i.e. on the one hand, purely numerical operations 
on data, producing output files with main results, and on the 
other hand, performing projections on maps, e.g. showing 
the (joint) geographical distribution of several variables, 
conditional frequencies, or predictions on the most important 
characteristics that are jointly affecting some outcome 
variable. It is also possible to treat maps as a survey, 
interpreting pixels as observations, or conduct interpolation 
on the map (filling empty gridcells with values inferred from 
available data).
For the analysis in the policy brief “The improvement of 
rural incomes – commercialization of farming households” 
(key results are in Section 7) the authors used the matching 
methodology to estimate the treatment effects for the 
policies considered. The aim of this analysis is to quantify 
the expected gains in some outcome variable (in this case: 
Sales Revenue) through pairwise matching of observations 
which belong to the treatment and the non-treatment 
groups, and are otherwise arguably identical. The outcome 
of the non-parametric estimation in matching is the average 
treatment effect on the treated, possibly conditional on some 
categorical variable (in this case: Social groups of farming 
households).
The second policy brief “Land lease and rent rates: towards 
benefit of smallholders” (key results are in Section 7) 
predominantly employs the multivariate profiling and spatial 
projection facilities of polling in order to identify structural 
patterns in the agricultural sector in Ukraine. It calculates 
the conditional frequencies of selected variables of the rent 
on land paid and received, and shows the classes with the 
highest frequency on a map. 
G R C P  –  P o l l i n g
Annex 1. GRCP – Polling
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1. Ukrainian Household Expenditures and Resources data 
(HERd) survey
This is an annual rural survey of around 10 000 households. 
The present study used the 2009 round, the latest 
version will be available in 2012. The survey records 
general information on structure and type of households, 
employment, educational level, professional skills, budget, 
social and economic priorities of households and household 
size. It has been used in the Agricultural Report and in the 
policy briefs on rural incomes and land lease, using GRCP. 
2. Social and economic characteristics of rural settlements 
in Ukraine 
All rural settlements are surveyed every 5 years, providing 
information on population and labor resources, economic 
entities (enterprises, households), social characteristics 
of villages, and social infrastructures. It has been used 
for background information in the Agricultural Report, and 
analyzed in depth in the Briefs, since the latest version is 
only for the year 2005 and the envisaged issue of 2010 did 
not materialize.
3. Main Economic Indicators of Agricultural Enterprises 
Information on approximately 7 000 enterprises on 
production and sales of products, costs of main production, 
assets and average number of workers and employees, land 
use, collected annually (data for the latest year 2010 is used 
in the brief). It has been used in the Agricultural Report and 
in Policy Brief 3, where it is merged with the HERd survey 
and data of NLV values at regional (Oblast) level provided by 
the State Agency of Land Resources.
S u r v e y s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  p r o j e c t
Annex 2.  Surveys used in this 
proyect
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